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JURISDICTION
Appellee Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") agrees
with the jurisdictional statement of Defendant/Appellant Zdenek Sorf ("Sorf).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Sorf identifies two general issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court abused
its discretion in denying his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment; and (2) whether
the district court erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim.
MWDSLS does not disagree with Sorf s statement of the issues.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 60fb\ Utah R. Civ. R:
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;... The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and . . . not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation....
Rule 13(d\ Utah R. Civ. P.:
"Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MWDSLS is a Utah Local District, a political subdivision of the State of Utah.
Utah Code Title 17B, Chapter 1 discusses Local Districts, while Utah Code Ann. §§ 17B-
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2a-601 through 608 particularly apply to Metropolitan Water Districts, a subset type of
Local District.
MWDSLS provides supplemental, treated, drinking water to its two (2) member
cities, Salt Lake City and Sandy City. MWDSLS water is critical to the water supply of
more than its member cities. Salt Lake City Public Utilities is the largest retail drinking
w7ater provider in the state, serving a large area outside of Salt Lake City boundaries.
While this matter deals with the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA"), MWDSLS has
interests in three large water treatment plants, five large water pipelines and five large
finished water reservoirs. These facilities are tied together and operate in a coordinated
fashion to provide redundancy, and service to both sides of the Salt Lake Valley.
The Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant ("LCWTP") receives raw water
from Little Cottonwood Creek, and from the Provo River System via the SLA. The SLA
is a mostly 69" inside diameter, 72" outside diameter, steel reinforced concrete, "open
flow," pipe. SLA carries raw water from the toe of Deer Creek Dam at the top of Provo
Canyon to the LCWTP.
MWDSLS owns a 2/7^ interest in the Jordan Valley Water Treatment Plant
("JVWTP") which is supplied with raw water primarily via the Jordan Aqueduct ("JA"),
which is a pressurized steel pipe that carries water from the Provo River. The recentlyconstructed Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant ("POMWTP") in Draper is
served raw water primarily via the Provo Reservoir Canal ("PRC"), which carries water
from the mouth of Provo Canyon. From the PRC at the point of the mountain, raw water
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is carried via the raw water portion of Point of the Mountain Aqueduct ("POMA") to
POMWTP.
On the finished water side, water can be moved from any of the three treatment
plants to serve east, west, south and north. The SLA is very much like one leg of a threelegged stool. SLA carries finished water to storage facilities at the LCWTP site, a
reservoir at approximately 7400 South, and Terminal Reservoir near the mouth of
Parley's Canyon. In all, SLA is more than 41 miles in length. The finished water portion
of JA carries treated water to a large terminal reservoir at approximately 5800 South and
3800 West, and then to 2100 South.
From POMWTP, treated water is carried via thefinishedwater portion of POMA,
a new pressurized steel pipe that reaches to the finished water SLA at the LCWTP. A
largefinishedwater reservoir is located at the POMWTP site. Finished water can be
moved through POMA in either direction. POMA is also tied to thefinishedwater
portion of JA via the 150 South Pipeline. Water can similarly be moved in either
direction in the 150th South Pipeline.
The United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation designed and
constructed the SLA from 1939 to 1942, and from 1946 to 1951 as part of the Provo
River Project. It is constructed of different classes of pipe, with different maximum and
minimum load/cover specifications. MWDSLS is making preliminary preparations for
major rehabilitation or replacement of the SLA in the upcoming decades.
SLA sits in the SLA corridor which is a mixture of deeded easement, reserved
easement, and fee lands. The deeded portions were initially acquired by MWDSLS. As
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

those lands and easements were acquired in the late 1940s and early 1950s they were
transferred to the United States, and MWDSLS was reimbursed. The amounts

*

reimbursed to MWDSLS were added to the total repayment obligation of MWDSLS.
The United States held title to the SLA and SLA corridor until October 2006 when the
SLA, SLA corridor and Terminal Reservoir were transferred to MWDSLS, pursuant to
the 2004 Provo River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Laws 108-382.
1

Sorf s home is in Sandy, Utah. The developer of Mr. Sorf s subdivision platted
the subdivision so that much of what would become Mr. Sorf s backyard was
encumbered by the previously deeded SLA easement. There MWDSLS holds the
perpetual easement "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including
"appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground surface. . . . " This
easement was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1946—decades before
what would become the Sorf lot was platted.
Unfortunately, Sorf has recently been installing large-scale improvements (rock
retaining walls, concrete slabs, water feature), structures (garage, large deck covering,
large gazebo), and additional fill on the SLA and the SLA corridor easement in his
backyard, and oddly, in the back half of his neighbor's lot. Such improvements imperil
the SLA, violate MWDSLS's easement, and are contrary to MWDSLS regulations, state
"blue stakes" law, and Sandy City ordinance. For more than twenty years, prior to Sorf s
installation and building, his back yard was appropriately landscaped with grass, some
flat work, and bushes. His backyard also contained some trees, which were prohibited by
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United States regulations and policies. United States enforcement was admittedly lax,
thus one of MWDSLS' motivations for title transfer.
MWDSLS became aware of Sorf s new installations and buildings upon routine
inspection of the SLA corridor in spring 2009. It repeatedly approached him to cease his
violative activities, restore its access to SLA, and remove those improvements which
violate MWDSLS's easement and regulations. Sorf refused MWDSLS at every turn and
declined or ignored eveiy effort to assist him in regulatory compliance. MWDSLS
sought to meet with Sorf on-site repeatedly, sent him three separate written notices which
included MWDSLS's SLA encroachment regulations, and posted two separate "stopwork" notices on his property—both of which were torn down. All the while Sorf s work
continued.
MWDSLS filed suit against Sorf for injunctive and declaratory relief and
damages. Sorf was served by a licensed process server on October 28, 2010 at 5:40 p.m.
with the Summons and Complaint and a letter from MWDSLS's counsel referencing the
commencement of the lawsuit and requesting a dialogue with him. Sorf did not answer
the Complaint. On November 22, 2010, Sorf spoke with MWDSLS's counsel, who
suggested that he call MWDSLS personnel to arrange a discussion. He did not contact
MWDSLS, nor did he file an answer. On December 1, 2010, MWDSLS moved the
district court to enter a default judgment, and mailed notice of its request for default
judgment to Sorf. On December 16, 2010, the district court entered the default judgment.
The default judgment was personally served on Sorf at his home on December 23, 2010.
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It was not until January 24, 2011 that Sorf even brought the default judgment to
his counsel's attention. He moved to set aside the default judgment on January 31, 2011
alleging mistake and excusable neglect. Despite his involvement as a named party in 28
separate Utah lawsuits, prior default judgments, and serving as an officer, director and
agent for purposes of service for five separate Utah corporate entities, Sorf asserts he is
somehow a neophyte in the most basic ways of the Courts, including service of process
and the obligation to respond to an action. Sorf s "mistake" was not "genuine," nor was
his neglect "excusable." The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sorf
had failed to demonstrate sufficient mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect
to justify setting aside the default judgment.
The district court also correctly found that Sorf did not meet the additional
"meritorious defense" requirement for setting aside a default. Every one of the defenses
Sorf asserted in his "[Proposed] Answer" fails as a matter of law, for the following
reasons:
1.

MWDSLS's easement is recorded, perpetual, and defined by its terms;

2.

MWDSLS's promulgated regulations are supported and authorized by law;

3.

one cannot adversely possess government real property;

4.

there is no such thing as abandonment of a utility easement when the utility
is still in the ground requiring operation, maintenance, and potential
relocation or replacement;

5.

any encroaching improvement on a utility easement making utility
maintenance or use more difficult is violative per se; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

equitable estoppel cannot be asserted against a governmental entity,
especially when based only on alleged comments of staff.

Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer" did not include a counterclaim. Four months after the
Default Judgment was entered, two and a half months after he offered his "[Proposed]
Answer," and one month after the court denied his motion to set aside the Default, Sorf
sought to file a counterclaim. The district court properly denied this request. Over the
course of many months prior to filing suit, MWDSLS made repeated efforts to protect the
easement by enforcement of its regulations. Sorf admits that MWDSLS issued a "stop
work" order to him on August 31, 2010 to halt all his activities. Likewise, Sorf admits he
received the letter of October 28, 2010 which accompanied MWDSLS's Summons and
Complaint. These are factual occurrences that gave rise to Sorf s misguided regulatory
taking counterclaim. Apparently realizing his counterclaim is barred, Sorf tries to tie his
regulatory taking claim to the default judgment—a judicial act—rather than MWDSLS's
pre-suit enforcement of its SLA regulations—a regulatory act.
Despite being well aware of MWDSLS's consistent efforts to make him comply
with the regulations governing servient owners9 use of the SLA easement, Sorf made no
timely effort to assert any claim for inverse condemnation. MWDSLS filed its Complaint
against him in October 2010, but his proposed Answer made no mention of any
counterclaim, let alone an inverse condemnation counterclaim. At no time during the
briefing or argument on Sorf s motion to set aside the default did he ever mention a
counterclaim of any kind. Instead, he waited until after the district court denied his
motion to set aside the default. It was only at that point, with the case firmly and finally
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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adjudicated by the district court, that he asked to file an inverse condemnation
counterclaim. The district court correctly denied his request, and this Court should

'

uphold that denial as correct.
RESPONSE TO SORPS STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
<

Sorf s Statement of Material Facts is flawed in many respects. Most significantly,
many of his supposed fact statements blend improper legal argument with otherwise
accurate fact statements and incorrect characterizations of those facts. Other fact
statements make tactical omissions of key details important to understanding why the
district court granted MWDSLS's Motion for Default Judgment, denied Sorf s Motion to
Set Aside Default, and denied his post-judgment motion to assert a counterclaim.
MWDSLS offers the following additional facts and clarifications to fill out the
procedural chronology, and ensure this Court sees the whole factual picture. The
numbered paragraphs presented below do not correspond to the numbered paragraphs in
Sorf s Appellant's Brief.
1.

MWDSLS's SLA regulations define the parameters of public use and

occupancy of its fee and easement lands. (Regulations for Non-District Use of Salt Lake
Aqueduct (R. 21-32) (attached as Add. 1.)) They are promulgated pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. $ 17B-1-103. (R. 10.)
2.

MWDSLS provided these regulations to Sorf along with a form

Cooperation Agreement for his continued limited use and occupancy of the SLA corridor
long before MWDSLS filed its Verified Complaint. (MWDSLS's Verified Complaint
(R.11,133.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

Disregarding the regulations, Sorf has made significant landscaping

improvements to his back yard, including earthwork, addition of fill, construction of rock
retaining walls and fencing, installation of concrete pads and a water feature, and
construction of a large shed or barn, a gazebo, and a hot tub. (Id. at R. 10-15.)
4.

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation established maximum and minimum

load/cover criteria for the several different classes of steel reinforced concrete pipe used
to construct the SLA. (See id. at 9-11.)
5.

MWDSLS now administers and licenses encroachments on the SLA;

previously that was the responsibility of the United States. (Id. at R. 8-11.) Unpermitted
encroachments on the easement present significant concerns with respect to SLA access,
repair, and replacement. (Id aX 9-10.)
6.

Sorf asserts as a "fact" that MWDSLS has "expanded" the easement, and

attempts to paint MWDSLS as "unilaterally" creating new rights for itself under the
easement. See Sorf s Statement of Facts at ^| 5. These assertions and characterizations of
MWDSLS's actions and the regulations are improper argument, and Sorf supports them
simply by citing to the regulations themselves. The regulations were propounded for
purposes of protecting the SLA and the SLA corridor, not expanding the easement, and
neither expressly nor impliedly support Sorf s argument that the regulations wrongly
expanded the easement.
7.

Sorf implies that there was some imperfection in service of the Summons

and Complaint upon him, stating that they were "left at Mr. Sorf s home, but not
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personally served on him." (Appellant's Brief at 3.) Sorf omits all details supporting the
district court's finding that the Summons and Complaint were properly served on him.
8.

The Summons and Complaint were served by a licensed process server at

5:40 p.m. on October 28, 2010 at Sorf s home to an adult female who answered the door
and verbally confirmed herself to be his wife. (Process Server Return of Service (R. 79)
(attached as Add. 2); Declaration of Mel Ashton at ^ 3-4 (R. 171) (attached as Add. 3.))
9.

MWDSLS's process server, Mel Ashton, is certified and licensed by the

Utah Department of Public Safety. Previously, Mr. Ashton was a Salt Lake City police
officer for eight years, and then was a US Drug Enforcement Agency officer for twenty
years. (Ashton Decl. at ^f 2 (R. 171.)) Mr. Ashton testified under penalty of perjury in
both his Return of Service and Declaration that he served the Complaint and Summons
and the letter, which Sorf admits he received, at Sorf s home. (Id. at ^f 4.)
10.

Mr. Ashton served the Summons and Complaint on an adult woman who

answered the front door. Mr. Ashton asked this woman "Are you Mrs. Sorf?" to which
she responded "Yes." (Id.) Apparently this woman, after receiving the documents inhand, threw them down. (Id. at ^ 5.)
11.

Also on October 28, 2010, Sorf received a letter from MWDSLS that

referenced the Summons and Complaint. (See October 28, 2011 letter from Shawn
Draney to Zdenek Sorf (R. 118.)) Sorf claims that the Summons and Complaint were not
actually enclosed with the letter—an assertion that the district court apparently found
unpersuasive in light of the service by the Process Server's affidavit. MWDSLS's letter
to Sorf invited a conversation in hopes of resolving the issues surrounding Sorf s
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unlicensed and violative improvements and structures on the SLA and in the SLA
corridor. (Id.)
12.

Sorf asserts that based on his reading of this letter, he believed that

MWDSLS would refrain from filing a lawsuit if a settlement could be reached.
(Appellant's Brief Statement of Facts at ^ 34). The letter contains no such statements,
either express or implied. (See October 28, 2011 letter (R. 118.)) In fact, the letter states
just the opposite as it references the Summons and Complaint that had been filed with the
Court commencing the lawsuit. (Id.)
13.

Sorf called Shawn Draney, counsel for MWDSLS, on November 22, 2010.

Sorf claims that his conversation with MWDSLS's counsel gave him the "impression"
that MWDSLS would only pursue a lawsuit if a settlement could not be reached.
(Appellant's Brief at 136.) However, the Record contains facts which would support the
district court's exercise of discretion to disregard Sorf s "impression": Mr. Draney told
Sorf this was a matter of great concern to MWDSLS, reiterated the importance of the
SLA and its corridor, and stated concerns that Sorf s landscaping and backyard structures
might add weight to the pipe that it was not designed to handle. Mr. Draney then
suggested Sorf call MWDSLS personnel and set up a meeting with them, and told Sorf
that he was going to proceed with the entry of a default as the time to answer had elapsed.
Mr. Draney gave Sorf the phone numbers for MWDSLS's General Manager, Mike
Wilson, and MWDSLS's Engineering Manager, Wayne Winsor. Given the importance
of this matter and the lack of any correspondence from Sorf, Mr. Draney had his
paralegal Deb Wharff present in his office during this telephone call. Ms. Wharff
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immediately memorialized the call in a written memorandum. No one on the call ever
requested or offered an extension of time for Sorf to file an answer. (Declaration of
Deborah M. Wharff at ^ 7 (R. 179) (attached as Add. 4); "DMW Memo re Call from
Sorf (R. 208) (attached as Add. 5.))
14.

Sorf asserts that he called both Mike Wilson and Wayne Winsor, but the

Record shows that neither Mr. Winsor nor Mr. Wilson ever received a phone call or
voicemail from Sorf. (Declaration of Michael L. Wilson at ^f 3 (R. 210-211) (attached as
Add. 6); Declaration of Wayne Winsor at 13 (R. 213-214) (attached as Add. 7.))
15.

Further all incoming calls to MWDSLS (whether answered or not) are

electronically logged. (Declaration of Ryan Nicholes at If 3 (R. 216-223) (attached as
Add. 8.)) Based on MWDSLS's electronic records of all incoming calls, Sorf never
called Mr. Wilson or Mr. Winsor. (Id. at ^ | 3-5 and telephone data records attached
thereto.)
16.

Sorf was repeatedly informed of the lawsuit and the danger of default. In

addition to MWDSLS's October 28, 2010 service of the Summons and Complaint on
Sorf, and the November 22, 2010 telephone conversation between Sorf and MWDSLS's
counsel, he received MWDSLS's Application for Default Judgment in December 2010.
(Sorf Decl. at ^f 12 (R. 115.)) The Application for Default Judgment specifically
referenced the filed Complaint and Summons, the date of service, and Defendant's failure
to answer. (Application for Default Judgment (R. 82-84) (attached as Add. 9))
17.

Despite all the notice given to Sorf about MWDSLS's action to protect the

SLA, he claims to have been completely ignorant of the Summons and Complaint, and
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the entry of default, until January 24, 2011. (Appellant's Brief atffl[52-53.) Likewise,
Sorf suggested to the district court that he was legally unsophisticated, and he argued that
he simply did not understand the importance of filing an answer to a complaint or
responding to an application for default judgment. (Memo, in Support of M. to Set Aside
Default Judgment (R. 108, 110.))
«

18.

According to records maintained by the Utah Division of Corporations,

Sorf is an officer, director, secretary, or registered agent for five separate Utah corporate
entities. (Wharff Decl. at f 6 (R. 176-180) (attached as Add. 4.))
19.

Prior to this lawsuit, Sorf had been a named party in 28 separate lawsuits in

the State of Utah alone. A number of these suits ended in entry of default judgment
against Sorf. {Id atffif3-5.)
20.

In Sorf s original motion to set aside the default judgment, he did not

submit any proposed answer, nor did he mention any counterclaim for inverse
condemnation. (R. 106-118.)
21.

On February 3, 2011, Sorf supplemented the Motion and Memo to Set

Aside Default Judgment with a "[Proposed] Answer." (R. 122-134.)
22.

His proposed Answer did not include any counterclaim. {See id.)

23.

The Court heard oral argument on Sorf s Motion to Set Aside Default

Judgment on March 8, 2011 and denied the Motion via ruling from the bench. (R. 345.)
24.

Per the Court's request, counsel for MWDSLS prepared a [Proposed] Order

Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ("Order") and submitted the
same to Sorf s counsel. (R. 353-355.)
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25.

On March 15, 2010, Sorf filed an Objection to the Order which contested

the decision of the Court, asserted the Court was in error on a host of legal and factual
points, and reargued these points. Sorf s objection made no mention of any claim for
inverse condemnation. (R. 350-352.)
26.

On March 17, 2011, MWDSLS responded to Sorf s Objection to the Order

noting that it was essentially an effort at reconsideration and was therefore specifically
disallowed under the Utah Rules as stated in Gillette v. Price. 2006 UT 24. 135 P.3d 861
27.

That same day, the Court signed the [Proposed] Order as submitted by

MWDSLS. (Order, signed March 17, 2011 (R. 353-55) attached as Add. 10.))
28.

According to the Order, "[t]he Default Judgment entered December 13,

2010 by this Court remains in full force and effect." {Id. at *f 2.)
29.

On April 14, 2011, Sorf indicated for the first time that he wished to file a

counterclaim. (R. 374-402.)
30.

His proposed counterclaim alleged that MWDSLS's regulations effected a

regulatory taking of his property. (R. 474-481.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sorf s Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment, because Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
does not necessarily require the district court to grant such motions in all cases. In this
case, the summons and complaint were properly served on Sorf, and he has extensive
experience with the civil justice system. He was well aware of the consequences of
failing to answer the complaint. Given these facts, he could not justify setting aside the
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default judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and
setting aside the default judgment would not have been "in furtherance of justice" as Rule
60(b) requires.
Moreover, Sorf misinterprets the second prong required for setting aside default
judgments: the "meritorious defense" requirement. The district court is not required to
set aside a default judgment if proffered defenses are meritorious; rather, a default
judgment must not be set aside unless defenses are meritorious. In any event, none of the
nineteen affirmative defenses he proffered (on appeal he asserts only four) were
meritorious:
1.

While the scope of MWDSLS' regulatory authority is not restrained by the

scope of its easement, the regulations do not exceed the scope of the easement;
2.

Sorf cannot adversely possess government land;

3.

Neither the U.S., nor MWDSLS abandoned the SLA easement; and

4.

MWDSLS cannot be equitably estopped from enforcing its regulations.

The district court correctly denied Sorf s post-judgment Motion for Leave to File a
Counterclaim, for five main reasons:
1.

Sorf s argument that he could not file his counterclaim until after the

district court had denied his Motion to Set Aside is not supported by logic, Utah law, or
takings jurisprudence. Nothing prevented Sorf from filing his counterclaim with his
proposed Answer. By that time, MWDSLS had taken all acts of enforcement of its SLA
easement rights and regulations. The district court's judgment was not the regulatory act
at issue, and could not constitute a taking.
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2.

There was no merit to Sorf s claim that MWDSLS's attempts to protect the

SLA through enforcement of the easement and the concomitant regulations constituted a
regulatory taking. MWDSLS has significant latitude to promulgate regulations as
necessary to protect its facilities and operations. These regulations are entitled to a high
degree of deference. Lastly, enforcement of MWDSLS's regulations does not destroy all
economically viable uses of Sorf s whole parcel of property. For more than twenty years,
Sorf s back yard was enjoyed without things like a large water feature, a large gazebo or
a large motorcycle barn, which are the items of greatest concern to MWDSLS.
3.

Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was essentially just a

second, improper motion to reconsider the district's court denial of his Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment. Such motions are expressly forbidden, and therefore
properly denied.
4.

Sorf never served a pleading as required under Rule 13(d) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

Sorf did not first reopen the Default Judgment, as required by case law.
ARGUMENT

L

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING SORF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT.
Rule 60(b) does not require a district court to set aside a default even if the movant

shows "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Rather, the court "may"
set aside a default judgment for these reasons, but only if (a) the motion is timely, and (b)
the court finds that setting aside the default is "in furtherance of justice." See Rule 60(b),
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Utah R. Civ. P. The question of what is "in furtherance of justice" obviously implicates
the court's equitable discretion. In weighing the equities, courts interpreting Rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have asked whether it would be "manifestly
unconscionable that a judgment be given effect." Atwellv. Equifax, Inc.. 86 F.R.D. 686.
688 n.2 (D.Md. 1980). Even if the movant satisfies all the requirements of Rule 60(b),
case law imposes an additional requirement: the movant must show that he "has a
'meritorious defense' to the action." Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462. ^[3. 104
P.3d 664 {quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Intl Forwarders, Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147. 1148
(Utah 1994)).
The district court's denial of Sorf s motion to set aside the default judgment is
"largely a discretionary matter," and should be reversed only if it is "clear the court
abused that discretion." Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979) {citing Warren
v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953)). "That some basis may exist to set aside
the default does not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing
to do so when facts and circumstances support the refusal." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92.
93 (Utah 1986). There are good reasons for this deferential appellate standard of review.
The district court sits closer to the facts than an appellate court, and is better able to
evaluate the equitable arguments in favor of setting aside a default:
In situations where the exercise of discretion is appropriate, considerable
weight should be given to the determination of the trial court, whichever
way it goes. This is true because due to his close involvement with the
parties, the witnesses, and the total circumstances of the case, he is in the
best position to judge what the interests of justice require in safeguarding
the rights and interests of all parties concerned.
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Barber v. Caldei\ 522 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1974) (affirming trial court's entry of default
judgment); see also, Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal 926 F.2d 1305. 1307 (2nd Cir.

<

1991) (finding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to set aside, and
explaining that "the trial judge, who is usually the person most familiar with the
circumstances of the case and is in the best position to evaluate the good faith and
credibility of the parties, is entrusted with the task of balancing these competing
considerations.") (applying Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
A.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Finding that
Sorf s Failure to Answer the Verified Complaint Was Not Diie to
Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect

I

Sorf argues that the district court failed to consider all of his arguments under Rule
60(b). Sorf is wrong, because the district court explicitly based its decision both "upon
the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented" at the hearing.
(Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (R. 353-354.)) Sorf argued in
his written submissions to the district court (as he is arguing again to this Court) that he
met the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1). Specifically, he claimed that he was not served
with the summons and complaint, and that he mistakenly believed no default would be
entered against him if he attempted to settle the lawsuit with MWDSLS. {See Sorf s
Memo, in Sup't of Mot. to Set Aside Default (R. 109-110.)) At the hearing, Sorf s
counsel again argued for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but the district court was not
persuaded, and directed MWDSLS to draft the order denying Sorf s Motion. The Order
stated:
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1.
Based on the Court's finding that Defendant was properly served
with the Complaint and Summons, that Defendant has not made an
adequate showing of excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence in his
failure to respond to the Complaint, and that those defenses proffered by
Defendant to Plaintiff's Complaint are not meritorious as a matter of law
under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined easement, its prior federal
ownership, and Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of the state, the
Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion.
(Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (R. 353-354) (emphasis
added.)) The district court thus duly considered whether Sorf had shown excusable
neglect, mistake, or inadvertence, and concluded that he had not.
Sorf objected to the court's Order with what was essentially a request that the
court reconsider the bases for its ruling. Sorf argued—as he argues again to this Court—
that the court had "misapprehended" his arguments as to "mistake, inadvertence, and
excusable neglect." (See Sorf s Objection to Proposed Order (R. 350-351.))1 He did not
argue that the proposed order did not accurately reflect the bases for the court's decision.
(See id.) The court disagreed with Sorf s arguments and signed the Order, thereby
memorializing the bases for its denial of Sorf s motion to set aside the default. "A
court's interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we
afford the district court great deference." Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008 UT 15,
1T9. 179P.3d786.
"[A] party trying to set aside a default judgment must show that he has used due
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had
1

"Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
Tschaezenv v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37. f 15. 163 P.3d 615 (citing Gillettv. Price.
2006 UT 24. Hf 5. 7-8. 135 P.3d 861) (directing attorneys to "immediately discontinue
the practice of filing post judgment motions to reconsider.").
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no control." Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855. 858 (Utah 1979) (internal quotation
omitted). "Utah precedent clearly establishes that some measure of diligence is necessary
to constitute excusable neglect. ..." Cadlerock Joint Venture II LP v. Envelope
Packazim 0f Utah Inc.. 2011 UT App. 98.1 9. 251 P.3d 837. "[I]f default is issued
when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would
not have occurred, the equity side of the court. . . [should] grant relief." Lund v. Brown,
2000 UT 75,110. llP.3d 277 {quoting May v. Thompson. 611 P.2d 1109. 1110 (Utah
1984)) (emphasis added); see also, Weiss v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 283 F.3d
790. 795 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Where default results from an honest mistake rather than
willful misconduct, carelessness or negligence there is especial need to apply Rule 60(b)
liberally." (emphasis added.)) Neglect is only excusable if the movant can show that he
"used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control." Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d429. 431
(Utah 1973). Here, Sorf s alleged "mistake" is not "honest" or "genuine" and his neglect
is not "excusable." Equity should not side with him.
Sorf claims that he did not receive the summons and complaint that were served
on him through an adult woman at his house. (Appellant's Brief at 24.) However, he
never moved for insufficiency of service of process per Rule 12(b)(5). Utah R. Civ. P.,
and thus waived any arguments about the sufficiency of process. See Rule 12(h). Utah R.
Civ. P.; Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061. 1067 (Utah 1991) (waiver of
defective process defense for failure to initially raise it by motion).
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The summons and complaint were properly served on Sorf. Mr. Mel Ashton of
A. A. & Associates, Inc., a licensed process server, swore under the penalty of perjury that
he served the Summons, Complaint, Exhibits and the October 28, 2010 letter from
MWDSLS's counsel to Sorf at his home at 5:40 p.m. on October 28, 2010. (See Proof of
Service (R. 79) (attached as Add. 2); Ashton Decl. atffij3-5 (R. 170-172), (attached as
Add. 3.)) Mr. Ashton served the papers on an adult female who answered the door and
verbally represented herself to be Sorf s wife. The Utah Court of Appeals provided
explicit instruction on this point in Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, 22 P.3d 1249:
This jurisdiction has never addressed whether a presumption of correctness
applies to a return of service by a private process server. We have held that
a sheriffs return of service is "'presumptively correct and is prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein,'5' but the "'invalidity or absence of
service of process can be shown by clear and convincing evidence.'"
Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 at ^f 11 (citation omitted). Moreover,
the person purportedly served has "the burden of showing that service was
invalid." Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Utah
1998). In Classic Cabinets, we extended the presumption of correctness to
a constable's return of service. See Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 at %
11. For the same reasons expressed in Classic Cabinets, we now extend the
presumption of correctness to a return of service by a private process
server. See id. at ^ 12. All process servers are subject to the same criminal
charges for falsifying a return of sendee. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12a-4
(1996). Since all process servers are held equally accountable under the
law, it follows that their returns of service should be given an equal
presumption of correctness. Thus, Stubbs's return of service certifying that
Husband was personally served is presumptively correct and can be
disproved only by clear and convincing evidence.

Idat^9.
It is critical to note that Sorf acknowledges he was served with the October 28,
2010 letter that, by its terms and under Mr. Ashton's Proof of Service, accompanied the
Summons and Complaint. (Appellant's Brief at 11, ^f 33.) Furthermore, Mr. Ashton also
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personally served the signed Default Judgment on Sorf and this same adult female at
i

Sorf s home at 1:09 p.m. on December 23, 2010. (See Default Judgment with service
notation (R. 100-103) (attached as Add. 11); Ashton Decl. atffi[7-9 (R. 170-172),
attached as Add. 3.))
Between these two service occasions, Sorf received five other documents in this
case by U.S. Mail. MWDSLS's counsel mailed via U.S. Mail to Sorf s home address: 1)
I

the Notice of Filing of Lis Pendens (October 28, 2010) which specifically referenced this
current and on-going case; 2) the Application for Entry of Default Judgment (December
1, 2010) which specifically referenced the filing and service of Summons and Complaint;
3) the Default Certificate (December 13, 2010) which also specifically referenced the
Summons and Complaint; 4) the Military Service Affidavit (December 13, 2010); and 5)
the Military Service Order (December 13, 2010). In sum, Sorf was served twice and was
mailed five case documents since the inception of the lawsuit.
Next, Sorf asserts that because MWDSLS's October 28, 2010 letter invited a
resolution dialogue and he spoke with MWDSLS's counsel about one month later, he
believed settlement negotiations might forestall the filing of a lawsuit. (Appellant's Brief
at 11, Iflj 34, 36.) Sorf also represents that he attempted to call Mr. Winsor and Mr.
Wilson at MWDSLS upon counsel's suggestion. (Id. at 12, «f 38.) These are fictional
representations for a number of reasons. First, the Summons and Complaint had already
been personally served at Sorf s home. (See Proof of Service and Ashton Decl.) Second,
on November 22, 2010, Mr. Draney specifically told Sorf to call Mr. Wilson or Mr.
Winsor at MWDSLS to discuss this matter but in the meantime, he was moving forward
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with his application for default judgment as the time to answer the Complaint had passed.
(Wharff Decl. at f 7 and DMW Memo.) Third, Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson have never
received telephone calls or voicemails from Defendant. (See Wilson Decl. at ^ 3 and
Winsor Decl. at ^j 3.) Confirming this, MWDSLS's incoming phone logs demonstrate
that no incoming phone calls (answered or not) came to MWDSLS from Mr. Sorf s
telephone numbers from December 3, 2010 forward. (See Nicholes Decl. at ^[ 3-5 and
MWDSLS telephone data records attached thereto.)
Sorf claims not to have known about the Summons and Complaint, and the entry
of default, until January 24, 2011. (See Appellant's Brief at 16,fflf52-53.) Similarly, he
suggested to the district court that he was legally unsophisticated, and he argued that he
simply did not understand the importance of filing an answer to a complaint or
responding to an application for default judgment. (R. 108-110.) The reality is that Sorf
is quite experienced in civil litigation. Based on Utah state court records, he has been a
party to some 28 separate lawsuits. (See Wharff Decl. at ^ 3.) He has retained a variety
of lawyers (including his current counsel Strong & Hanni) on many of these occasions,
including matters involving failures to appear and default judgments. (Id. at ^f 5.)
Moreover, he is an officer, director, and/or registered agent for five Utah registered
corporate entities. (Id. at ^ 6.) In other words, sendee of process and default judgments
are familiar territory for Sorf. There is no "genuine mistake," "due diligence," or
"excusable neglect" here. There is only a habitual and willful refusal to respond.
Courts have upheld default judgments against defendants with far better arguments
for excusable neglect than Sorf can show here. For example in Arbogast Family Trust v.
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River Crossings, LLC, Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's entry of a default
judgment rejecting the defendant's assertion of mistake and excusable neglect. The

i

defendant argued that it did not answer the complaint for a number of reasons including
previous correspondence with plaintiff and counsel, resolution discussions, the
withdrawal of counsel, and new counsel's vacation. 2008 UT App 277. If^f 25-28. 191
P.3d 39. The defendant in Arhogast was far more engaged and responsive to the action
than Sorf has been in this matter, but nevertheless, the Court could not find a "reasonable
justification or excuse for [Defendant's] failure to answer." Id. at ^ 28.
B.

Sorf s Alleged "Meritorious Defenses" Do Not Entitle Him To Have the
Default Judgment Set Aside.

Sorf objects that the district court gave short shrift to his supposedly meritorious
defenses. However, his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment did not even mention his arguments on the merits. (See Memo, in Sup't of M.
to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 109-111.)) Instead, he simply submitted a proposed
answer as an after-the-fact "supplement" to his Memorandum. (R. 122-134.) Even
though Sorf presented essentially no written argument that the defenses in his proposed
Answer were meritorious, the district court nonetheless considered the defenses and
expressly found that they were "not meritorious." (Order Denying Def s M. to Set Aside
Default (R. 353-354.))
While Judge Fratto's order indicates that he found Sorf s defenses to be not
meritorious as a matter of law, Sorf mistakenly argues that the district court subsequently
"admit[ed] that Mr. Sorf s defenses were never actually considered and no determination
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as to the merits of the defenses made." (Appellant's Brief at 21; 30.) In reality, the
court's written Order is accurate, and the court never "admitted" otherwise. Judge Fratto
clearly stated that he "did, as part of Mr. Belnap's motion to reconsider this, opine in
terms of the—whether there was a meritorious defense presented" for purposes of a
motion to set aside a default. (Hearing Transcript (R. 558.)) Analysis of whether
proffered defenses are "meritorious" as a matter of law for purposes of a motion to set
aside under Rule 60(b) is crucially different from a ruling on the merits. Judge Fratto did
not act as fact finder to rule on the merits of Sorf s defense, but he was not supposed to.
Sorf incorrectly asserts that relief from a default judgment "is warranted when" the
movant shows a meritorious defense. (Appellant's Brief at 29.) This misconstrues the
"meritorious defense" requirement. It is not a tool for setting aside defaults, but rather
another hurdle a defendant must clear to set aside a default and have his defenses
considered. Simply showing a meritorious defense does not necessarily entitle the
movant to have the default set aside. Generally, parties in default are "not entitled to be
heard on the merits of the case." Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193. 1195 (Utah 1984).
"[I]t is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of
meritorious defenses unless the court is satisfied" that the other requirements of Rule
60(b) have been established. See State By and Through Utah State Dept. of Social Servs.
v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053,1056 (Utah 1983).
As noted above, Rule 60(b) provides that if a movant meets the requirements of
Rule 60(b), the court "may" set aside the default if necessary to serve the interests of
justice. The case law cited by Sorf does not suggest that showing a meritorious defense
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entitles the movant to have the default set aside. See Lund 2000 UT 75. 11 P.3d 277.
The trial court has significant discretion to decide whether the facts of a particular case

<

justify setting aside default. In other words, a party in default is not entitled to demand
that the trial court consider the merits of his defenses, but the trial court must ensure that
i

the defenses are meritorious prior to setting aside a default.
In considering whether defenses are meritorious or not, trial courts should avoid
"mini-trials" analyzing the facts allegedly supporting the defense. See Musselman, 667
P.2dat 1059 (Durham, J. dissenting). Rather, the purpose of the meritorious defense
requirement is to determine whether the defenses would be "meritorious as a matter of

{

law," assuming the movant could adduce facts to support them. Id^ That is precisely
what the trial court did in this case. The court found that Sorf s proffered defenses "are
i

not meritorious as a matter of law under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined
easement, its prior federal ownership, and Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of
the state." (Order (R. 354.))
Sorf s proposed Answrer asserted nineteen affirmative defenses, but on appeal he
has chosen to rely on only four. {See Appellant's Brief at 30-34 (relying on the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth2 Affirmative Defenses.)) Sorf has tacitly conceded that
the other fifteen affirmative defenses asserted to the district court were not meritorious.
MWDSLS addresses each of the remaining four defenses below.

2

While separately numbered, the Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses are actually both
part of the same defense: equitable estoppel.
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1.

The Regulations Do Not Exceed the Scope of MWDSLS Authority.

Sorf s argues that MWDSLS's regulations exceed the scope of the easement. (See
Appellant's Brief at 30-31 (citing First Affirmative Defense (R. 125-26.)) It is important
to recognize that Sorf has incorrectly framed the argument regarding the validity of
MWDSLS's regulations. The validity of the regulations does not turn on whether they go
beyond the scope of the use restrictions to which MWDSLS is legally entitled by virtue
of its ownership of the SLA easement. Rather, the validity of the regulations turns on
whether Sorf can establish that MWDSLS exceeded its authority to promulgate them
(which Sorf does not attempt to argue). As a very separate issue, even if a regulation is
valid it may result in a taking for which compensation must be paid. MWDSLS
addresses this second argument below in Section II of this Brief, in the context of Sorf s
post-judgment motion for leave to file a regulatory takings counterclaim. However,
MWDSLS's regulations, its exercise of a governmental function, satisfy even Sorf s
erroneous standard, because MWDSLS's regulations are fully consistent with MWDSLS'
proprietary property rights.
It is undisputed that MWDSLS's easement, by its terms and law, is perpetual and
defined. It allows MWDSLS "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA,
including "appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground
surface...." (See Easement Deeds (R. 39-49) (attached as Add. 12.)) It was recorded
with the Salt Lake County Recorder in 1946. Id. It was held by the United States until
2006. Id. The SLA sits within this easement. As a matter of law, MWDSLS's rights are
dominant to Sorf s servient estate. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
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§ 1.2 (2000) ("An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the
possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized
by the easement."), cited in Holladay Town Center, LLC v. Brown Family Holdings,
LLC. 2011 UT 9. ^T 36. n.l L 238 P.3d. 452. While Sorf s [Proposed] Answer offered
generic language regarding a dominant estate holder's "limited and reasonable use" of the
easement land, the case law specific to utility easements explicitly supports full and
perpetual utilization of the easement free of impediment from the servient estate. Id_
This is a critical theme that guides MWDSLS and other utilities nationwide, as the
following cases demonstrate:
•

Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprises, Inc., 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.
1991). In this case, the Tenth Circuit supported the pipeline easement holder's
claim for injunctive relief mandating the removal of fill and asphalt overlying the
company's high-pressure liquid gas pipeline easement. The court held that asphalt
and fill were "structures" within the meaning of the easement and that such
materials substantially interfered with the operation and maintenance of the
company's pipeline, including surveillance, surveys, excavation, maintaining, leak
detection, and repairing the pipeline. The court pointed out that "[a]n obstruction
or disturbance of an easement is anything which wrongfully interferes with the
privilege to which the owner of the easement is entitled by making its use less
convenient and beneficial than before." Id. at 1527 (citation omitted).

•

Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Wachter Const., Inc., 731 S.W.2d445
(Miss. Ct. App. 1987). In this case, the servient estate owner introduced between
six and ten feet of fill and some asphalt surfacing over plaintiffs natural gas
pipeline easement. The court ruled that the fill and asphalt over the pipeline right
of way interfered with the pipeline owner's easement for various reasons. The
court held that "[t]he serving estate owner may not make the easement less useful
or convenient." 731 S.W.2d at 450 (citation omitted). The easement grant to the
pipeline company included the right to "lay, construct, reconstruct, replace, renew,
maintain, repair, operate, change the size of, and remove pipes and pipelines for
the transportation of gas . .. over, through, upon, under and across" the
defendant's property. Id. at 446.
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•

Banyan Const. Co., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 840 S.W.2d 298 (Ms. Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, the court held that the construction of a home encroaching on a 150
foot wide utility transmission line easement was not allowed even though there
was no utility line in place at that time. The court noted that the easement held by
the electric utility company granted it the right to install, maintain, or relocate its
lines within the easement at any time. The court held that despite the fact that the
home was substantially completed, the easement and the rights there under
prevailed and the building and improvement upon the easement were to be
removed. Id. at 301-302.

•

Cox v. East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co.. 136 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In this
case, the court held that the servient estate owner's proposal to place four or more
feet of additional fill over a gas pipeline unreasonably interfered with the easement
holder's rights due to the potential for increased excavation time, the necessity of
bringing in additional equipment to make the now required deeper excavations,
and the resulting time delays for such maintenance. Id. at 628. The gas pipeline
easement in Cox echoed MWDSLS's easement, specifically providing for "laying,
constructing, maintaining, operating, altering, replacing, inspecting, patrolling,
servicing, repairing and removing pipelines . . . . " Id. at 627.
Sorf wildly exaggerates the impact of MWDSLS's regulations, claiming he has

been "deprived of all useful purpose of his backyard." (Appellant's Brief at 3.) In his
"[Proposed] Answer," he asserted that MWDSLS is expanding its easement and
preventing his "reasonable uses of his property" by imposing MWDSLS's regulations for
non-district use of the SLA corridor. ([Proposed] Answer at 2 (R. 122-134.)) This is not
a supportable defense, for a number of reasons. First, Sorf fails to acknowledge that his
backyard was just that—a landscaped back yard (grass, trees, bushes, some flatwork)—
for over twenty years before he began his large-scale improvements in 2009. With
MWDSLS's regulations, he still has a landscaped back yard, just as he has had for the
more than two decades he has lived at his current address. Second, MWDSLS's
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regulations are promulgated in accordance with statute3 and come with a strong
presumption of validity.4 More importantly, they specifically allow for Sorf and most, if
not all, other servient estate holders to license certain SLA corridor encroachments—-just
as was done with the United States Bureau of Reclamation for the previous six decades.5
(See MWDSLS Regulations, Chapter 16 - Regulation for Non-District Use of SLA, (R.
21-32) (attached as Add. 1.)) Even a cursory review of these regulations reveals the
nature, concerns, and protection specifications for the SLA, as well as the licensing
process and the rights of appeal for each applicant—neither of which Sorf has availed
himself to. (Id.) In sum, MWDSLS's regulations allow for landscaping, certain
hardscapes, and existing trees more than twenty feet from the center of the aqueduct.
Sorf is free to enjoy all these things, just as he did in the past.
Lastly, regardless of Sorf s knowledge or perspective on MWDSLS's easement,
his continued occupation of it constitutes trespass per se:

3

See Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1-30U2XJ).

4

See, e.g., State v. Amaru 2004 UT App 32. ^T 10, 100 P.3d 231 ("It is a basic principle
that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity."); 6
McQuillin Mun. Corp. $ 20:6 (3rd ed.) (same).
5

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation regulations have long required encroachment licenses on
federal reclamation rights of way. See 43 C.F.R. 429.7. Before MWDSLS's regulations,
there was a well-established framework for managing encroachments. See "Land Use
Authorizations" in Reclamation Manual: Directives and Standards, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (Jan. 3, 2002) (providing "standard procedures for issuing land use
authorization documents such as easements, leases, licenses, and permits which allow
others to use Reclamation lands and interests in its land . . . ."), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/recman/lnd/lnd08-01.pdf. Therefore, Sorf s assertion that
MWDSLS's regulations present a new and never before seen regulatory environment is
patently incorrect.
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In order to be liable for a trespass on land under the rule stated in
[Restatement] § 158, it is necessary only that the actor intentionally be
upon any part of the land in question. It is not necessary that he intend to
invade the possessor's interest in the exclusive possession of his land and,
therefore, that he know his entry to be an intrusion.
Gallezos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40. If 11. 178 P.3d 922 {quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 164 cmt. a (1965)).
2.

Sorf Cannot Adversely Possess the SLA Easement.

There is no merit to Sorf s argument for adverse possession. {See Appellant's
Brief at 32-33 (citing Third Affirmative Defense) (R. 127.)) There is simply no such
thing as adverse possession of government property. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-216; see
also 10 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 28:71 (3rd ed.) (title to property held by a municipal
corporation for a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession); 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Adverse Possession § 268 (generally, title by adverse possession cannot be acquired as to
public property or to property held as a public trust); Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697,
698-99 (Utah 1934) (title to public domain cannot be acquired by adverse possession by
inclosing part of public domain within fence); Nvman v. Anchor Development L.L.C*
2003 UT 27.112. 73 P.3d 357 (same); Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman. 152 P. 178 (Utah
1915) (same). The United States held this easement from 1946 to 2006. Since then
MWDSLS has held it in trust for the public. (Easement Deeds (R. 39-49) (attached as
Add. 12.)) Sorf s adverse possession defense is without merit.
3.

Neither the U.S. nor MWDSLS Abandoned the Easement.

There is no way Sorf could ever establish that MWDSLS had somehow abandoned
the SLA Easement. {See Appellant's Brief at 32-33) (citing Fourth Affirmative Defense
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

(R. 127)). In hunt v. Lance, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed the
requirements for abandonment of an easement:
An easement is abandoned where there is action releasing the right to use
the easement combined with clear and convincing proof of the intent to
make no further use of it. Put another way, a history of non-use, coupled
with an act or omission showing a clear intent to abandon is sufficient to
show abandonment. Actual abandonment or intent to abandon may also be
inferred from extended non-use of a portion of an easement ;;in connection
with other facts. In determining whether an easement has been abandoned,
courts should consider whether or not the right was acquired by
prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the actual intent of the
owner.
2008UTApp 192,1125, 186P.3d978 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Sorf s
[Proposed] Answer asserted that MWDSLS's SLA corridor easement was abandoned
because there has been little if any activity on the ground. ([Proposed] Answer at 3 (R.
127.)) As detailed above, the SLA has been in the ground for six decades. It is a
perpetual easement "to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including
"appurtenant structures, which latter may be situated above ground surface . . . . "
(Easement Deeds (R. 39, 48) (attached as Add. 12.)) Sorf s assertion that a long
undisturbed utility line and supporting easement are somehow lost to abandonment by the
passage of time defies law and logic. Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder. 567
P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977) ("[A] right gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use
alone and . . . an actual intent to abandon [must] be evident."). It should go without
saying that underground utilities pervade all developed urban and rural areas, and their
maintenance, operation, reconstruction, and relocation is critical for public welfare and
safety. Such is the case here. Sorf has demonstrated nothing that would give any
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indication of MWDSLS's abandonment of the SLA and its corridor. To the contrary,
MWDSLS conducted routine inspections of the SLA corridor and affirmatively took
steps to address Sorf s unlicensed encroachments thereon. (Verified Compl. atffif33-35
(R. 11-12.))
4.

MWDSLS Cannot Be Equitably Estopped from Protecting the SLA.

There is no merit to Sorf s final defense of equitable estoppel. (See Appellant's
Brief at 33) (citing Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses (R. 127-28)). Equitable
estoppel6 is generally not available against governmental entities:
Our decision is reinforced by the institutional reluctance of Utah courts to
apply equitable doctrines against municipal bodies and governmental
subdivisions. See Eldredge v. Utah State Ret Bd* 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that "the doctrine of [equitable] estoppel is not
assertable against the state and its agencies"); Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment 685 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Utah 1984) (Howe5 J., dissenting)
(explaining that generally, courts are reluctant to impose the equitable
doctrines of laches and waiver against governmental subdivisions).
Tooele Assoc. LP. v. Tooele City, 2011 UT App 36, f 3. 251 P.3d 835; see also Vial v.
Provo City, 2009 UT App 122, ^T 26, 210 P.3d 947 ("As a general rule, estoppel may not
be invoked against a governmental entity.").

6

The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.

Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671. 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Sorf seemingly acknowledges this general rule, but argues that this case presents
"unusual circumstances.'5 He attempts to parlay alleged conversations with MWDSLS

<

employees into binding approval of his easement encroachments, claiming the evidence
of his detrimental reliance on alleged oral statements is so clear that he would suffer a
grave "injustice" if MWDSLS were not equitably stopped from protecting the SLA
easement. (Appellant's Brief at 33-34.) An additional basis for his equitable estoppel
defense, newly raised in this appeal, is that Sorf looked around his neighborhood and
could not tell that MWDSLS was enforcing its rights under the SLA easement against
other servient property owners.7 Sorf never asserted this in his proposed Answer. (See

i

[Proposed] Answer at 3-4 (R. 127-28.))

:
.
' Essentially, Sorf is making an Equal Protection Clause "class of one" claim without
formally declaring it as such. The federal courts have described such claims as follows:
In the paradigmatic class-of-one case, a public official inflicts a cost or
burden on one person without imposing it on those who are similarly
situated in material respects, and does so without any conceivable basis
other than a wholly illegitimate motive.. . . The paradigmatic "class of
one" case, more sensibly conceived, is one in which a public official, with
no conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some other improper
motive (improper because unrelated to his public duties), comes down hard
on a hapless private citizen.
HighlandDev. Inc. v. Duchesne County. 505 F. Supp. 2d 1129. 1150 (D. Utah. 2007)
(quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County. 440 F.3d 1202> 1209 (10th Cir.
2006). To establish a "class of one" Equal Protection claim, Sorf would have to show
two elements: (1) that MWDSLS intentionally treated him differently from others
similarly situated; and (2) "that the official action was objectively irrational and abusive."
Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). "[W]hen the class consists of one
person or entity, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any difference in treatment
is not attributable to a quirk of the plaintiff or even to the fallibility of administrators
whose inconsistency is as random as it is inevitable." Jicarilla. 440 F.3d at 1212-13
(emphasis added).
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If this Court found Sorf s equitable estoppel arguments meritorious, it would
represent an unprecedented expansion of the narrow exception upon which Sorf relies.
Although our courts have never required that the governmental statement
be written, our supreme court has observed that u[t]he few cases in which
Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved
very specific written representations by authorized government entities."
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 839 P.2d 822. 827 (Utah 1992). In both
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689
(Utah 1979). and Eldredze v. Utah State Retirement Board. 795 P.2d 671
(Utah Ct.App. 1990). Utah appellate courts applied equitable estoppel
against government entities based on "very clear, well-substantiated
representations by government entities." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 828
(discussing Celebrity Club and Eldredge).
McLeodv. RetirementBd. 2011 Utah App. 190.122, 257 P.3d 1090. In McLeodAhe
plaintiff claimed he detrimentally relied on three different telephone conversations with
government employees. Those conversations were corroborated, the plaintiff claimed, by
documents later mailed to him and posted on a government website. Id_ atfflf23-24.
Neither the conversations nor the subsequent written corroboration justified an equitable
estoppel claim against the government entity because "in our view, they fall short of
'very clear, well-substantiated representations by government entities.5" Id. (quoting
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm % 839 P.2d 822. 828 (Utah 1992)). Sorf s equitable
estoppel defense is based on similar alleged verbal statements, but lacks any of the
documentary corroboration that was asserted in McLeod. Even if properly raised on
appeal, Sorf s uninformed assumption that MWDSLS was not enforcing the SLA
easement around his neighborhood would also obviously "fall short of 'very clear, wellsubstantiated representations by government entities/" McLeod, 2011 Utah App. 190. f
22.
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Finally, government employees cannot bind the governmental entity to
commitments or conveyances that would divest assets held in trust for the public without

<

approval of the legislative body or receipt of fair market value compensation. See, e.g.,
Sears v. Ogden. 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake Co. Comm. v. Salt Lake Co.
Atom 1999 UT 73. % 31. 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Price Dev. Co. v. Or em City. 2000
UT26.1T26,995P.2dl237. The SLA and the SLA corridor are MWDSLS assets held in
trust for the public. As a matter of law, MWDSLS staffs alleged comments to Sorf do
not support his equitable estoppel defense.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED SORFS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM,

<

Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was properly denied for five
distinct reasons. First, his argument that his counterclaim did not ripen until after the

(

court had denied his Motion to Set Aside is not supported by logic or Utah law. Second,
his Motion for Leave was doomed because MWDSLS5s actions did not constitute a
(

r

regulatory taking. Finally, three distinct procedural flaw s justified the district court's
denial of Sorf s motion.
A.

Sorf s Cause of Action Accrued When MWDSLS Expressly Demanded
that Sorf Comply With the SLA Easement and its Regulations—Not
When the Judgment Was Entered.

Sorf argues that MWDSLS's pre-litigation demands that he stop all encroaching
landscaping did not ripen his counterclaim. Instead, he claims, it ripened only when there
was a court judgment ratifying MWDSLS's attempts to enforce the SLA easement and
regulations. A cause of action for a regulatory taking accrues when a government entity
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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seeks to apply the regulations to the landowner's detriment. See Gillmor v. Summit
County. 2010 UT 69, 246 P.3d 102. As the Court in Gillmor explained:
[0]nce an allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinance is applied to a land
owner to prevent her from using or developing her property in a beneficial
way, she has suffered an injury, her cause of action accrues, and she may
seek redress by bringing a timely challenge to the application of the
ordinance to her in a district court action . . . .
2010 UT 69. m 33. Thus, Sorf s regulatory taking claim ripened when MWDSLS took
o

action to enforce its regulatory rights under the easement.
Like Sorf, the appellee in National Advertising v. Murray City argued "that only
after receiving final confirmation [from the court] that their permit was valid were they
able to pursue a counterclaim for breach of contract." 2006 UT App. 75, ^f 9, 131 P.3d
872. The Court disagreed:
We note that the Crawfords' contention that they could not file their claim
for breach of contract and damages until the court found their permit to be
Sorf s attack on the regulations does not seem to be limited in how the regulations were
applied to him. To the contrary, he seems to mount a facial challenge to the regulations,
arguing that they simply go beyond the scope of SLA easement language:
The SLA easement does not prohibit Mr. Sorf, or any other landowner,
from installing improvements nor does it authorize the District to compel
the removal of improvements. As such, it is Mr. Sorf s position that the
authority granted through the default judgment [based on the regulations]
dramatically exceeds the express language of the easement.
(Appellant's Brief at 31 (emphasis added.)) The law is clear that a claim for a facial
regulatory taking accrues when the regulations are promulgated:
A facial challenge to a land use regulation becomes ripe upon the
enactment of the regulation itself.... [T]his limited rule was meant to
apply only to facial challenges to regulatory takings where the injury to the
plaintiff is said to occur at the moment the ordinance is enacted and the
plaintiffs property value is "taken."
Gillmor, 2010 UT 69 at Tf 31 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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valid makes little sense. The Crawfords could have filed their claim as part
of their original complaint and simply requested that the trial court
bifurcate the proceedings. Such action would have eliminated the present
procedural morass.

<

Id. at II26, n. 18. Sorf s argument that he had to wait until after the district court issued a
final judgment confirming MWDSLS's regulatory rights is wrong.

*

Sorf s claim for inverse condemnation matured when MWDSLS sought to enforce
the SLA easement regulations against him. MWDSLS told Sorf to stop work on his
backyard landscaping—which, according to Sorf, cost him "nearly $150,000"—in
August 2010. (Sorf s Mem. in Sup't of Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim, citing
i

Declaration of Zdenek Sorf at % 44 (R. 385.)) While MWDSLS had diligently
communicated with Sorf and sought to enforce the regulations long before then (see
Verified Complaint atfflj30-48 (R. 11-14)), Sorf has admitted that MWDSLS clearly

<

sought to enforce the regulations against him no later than August 2010. In fact, a
photograph depicting the stop work order, dated August 31, 2010, is attached as
i
Addendum 14 to this brief (Exhibit 9 to MWDSLS's Verified Complaint (R. 67.))
Thus, by Sorf s own admission, MWDSLS enforced the SLA easement regulations
against him approximately two months before MWDSLS even filed suit against him.

*

MWDSLS's Verified Complaint was the culmination of this enforcement. It w7as based
on the terms of the SLA easement and the appurtenant regulations, and demanded the
removal of landscaping and structures, as well as the entry of a Cooperation Agreement
to define the rights and obligations of the parties. There can be no doubt that
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MWDSLS's Verified Complaint itself was the final articulation of MWDSLS's easement
rights and the application of its regulations to Sorf s property.
Sorf s own proposed Counterclaim acknowledges that MWDSLS sought to
impose the SLA easement restrictions and regulations upon Sorf prior to the entry of the
Default Judgment. (See Counterclaim (Proposed) (R. 479 atfflj36-40) (attached as Add.
13.)) This should be obvious—without Sorf s violation of those restrictions and
regulations, MWDSLS would have had no need to file the Complaint in the first place.
Nonetheless, Sorf s allegations in the proposed Counterclaim tellingly blame not just the
Default Judgment for his alleged inverse condemnation, but also (i.e., separately)
MWDSLS's imposition of the restrictions and regulations on him. (See id. (R. 479.))
Sorf alleges that MWDSLS's restrictions and regulations "eliminated any economically
viable use of his property," and, most importantly, that they were an "additional]" cause
of the default judgment. (R. 479 at ^fl[ 36-40 (emphasis added.)) He complains that an
inverse condemnation has occurred "through the default judgment and the restrictions
and regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property, the character of the governmental
actions, the economic impact of these actions on Mr. Sorf, and the extent to which the
regulatory actions have interfered with Mr. Sorf s use and enjoyment of his property."
(R. 479-480 at Tf 39 (emphasis added)). Thus, Sorf has acknowledged that his inverse
condemnation counterclaim claim arose not merely from the default judgment, but also
from (1) the "restrictions and regulations" imposed on Sorf, and (2) the "character of the
governmental actions." These "restrictions and regulations" and "governmental actions"
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all occurred before the court below entered the Default Judgment against Sorf, and indeed
before MWDSLS even filed suit.

<

Even if a judgment was needed for Sorf s inverse condemnation claim to mature,
such a judgment existed as of December 13, 2010, when the district court entered the
Default Judgment. (R. 99.) Nothing prevented Sorf from filing a proposed counterclaim
with his Motion to Set Aside on January 28, 2011, but he filed no counterclaim at that
time. (R. 104-112.) Nothing prevented Sorf from filing a proposed counterclaim along
with his "[Proposed] Answer5 on February 3, 2011, but he filed no counterclaim at that
time either. (R. 122-134.) He did not try to file his counterclaim until April 14, 2011, a

<

full four months after judgment was entered. (R. 374.)
Sorf s position is that "there was no taking . . . until the Default Judgment was
i
finalized." (Appellant's Brief at 35.) Sorf uses the word "finalized" not because it is
found anywhere in Rule 13(d), but because it implies that he was correct to wait until
after MWDSLS Court denied his Motion to Set Aside to try and file his counterclaim. If

-

attempts to undo a valid judgment prevent it from being "finalized," then Sorf s
counterclaim is not ripe even to this day. "A Utah State court judgment is not final while

,

an appeal is pending or until the time to appeal has expired.55 Chavez v. Morris. 566 F.
Supp. 359. 360 (citing Young v. Hansen. 218 P.2d 674. 675 (Utah 1950) (holding that "a
55

1

judgment is not final pending appeal. ). Thus by Sorf s reasoning, there is no taking, and
his counterclaim is not ripe, until this Court affirms the denial of his motion to set aside
the Default Judgment. This absurd result is the logical consequence of crediting Sorf s
argument that he could not file his counterclaim until the Default was "finalized.55
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Sorf asserts that "multiple courts outside of Utah" have "consistently" supported
his position, but cites only two cases from Colorado to support this assertion.
(Appellant's Brief at 40-41.) The first case Sorf cites, Droste v. Board of County
Commissioners, does not actually support his argument. As quoted by Sorf:
A taking claim is ripe if the government entity charged with implementing
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations to the property at issue, and determination whether a taking has
occurred cannot be made until a court knows the extent of permitted
development on the land in question.
85 P3d 585, 591 (Colo. App. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here,
MWDSLS did reach a "final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue," and MWDSLS's regulations for the SLA easement quite clearly
delineate "the extent of permitted development on the land in question." I<L_ The Droste
appellants argued that the decision of a particular Colorado board of commissioners,
which statutorily charged with deciding whether a taking had occurred, was
unconstitutional. Id, at 590. However, at the same time the appellants were asking the
Colorado Court of Appeals to decide that issue, a case was still pending in the trial court.
Id. at 591. That is why the constitutional takings issue was not yet ripe for decision. Id_
The case of Williams v. City of Central is likewise inapposite. There, the property
owner alleged that a temporary moratorium on gambling activities effected a regulatory
taking of his property. However, the moratorium lasted only ten months, and the
property owner was never denied a permit to conduct any economically viable activity on
his property. That is why the court found that "his claim for inverse condemnation, to the
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extent that it is based on a permanent regulatory taking, is not ripe for review." 907 P.2d
701, 708 (Colo. App. 1995).

<

Sorf emphasizes a statement quoted in Williams that a "court cannot determine
whether a regulation has 'gone too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes."
Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs. 856 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1993). But
Sorf does not quote the next sentence in the Reale decision: "That effect cannot be
measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to the
property in question." Id_ A review of Reale quickly reveals that the court was not
referring to itself with this passive-voice statement. Instead the court meant that the

4

government entity's actions—not a court judgment—were needed to ripen the inverse
condemnation claim. See id. at 93-94.
I
In Reale * a developer had petitioned a city council for a change to the zoning
ordinance governing his property. After the city council indicated it was not inclined to
grant his rezoning request, he withdrew the request. Id. at 93. Because an inverse

*

condemnation claim is "not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to

.

the property at issue," the court found that the property owner's inverse condemnation
claim was not ripe. Id. at 94 ("Here, because Reale withdrew its zoning request, there has
\

been no final decision.").
In summary, the Colorado cases Sorf cites simply do not support the proposition
that Sorf s inverse condemnation claim did not ripen until the district court denied his
motion to set aside the Default Judgment. To the contrary, they show that what is needed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is concrete action by a governmental entity to regulate the property owner's land in such
a way as to deprive all useful benefit of it. All of the regulatory actions upon which Sorf
would assert his claim for inverse condemnation had already occurred before MWDSLS
ever filed its Verified Complaint. The district court therefore properly denied his Motion
for Leave to File a Counterclaim.
B.

MWDSLS's Actions Do Not Give Rise to a Regulatory Taking Claim.

A categorical regulatory taking requires, among other things, the application of a
zoning law or other governmental regulation that denies all economically beneficial use
of the land. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL 505 U.S. 1003. 1015-16
(1992); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). For a categorical taking to occur, the "whole parcel" must
be deprived of all economically beneficial use. There is no taking if one portion of the
parcel is deprived of economically beneficial use, but the remainder is not directly
affected. Perm Central Transv. Co. v. City ofNew York. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). "Taking
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a single segment have been entirely abrogated." Id. at 130.
If a claimant cannot establish that his "whole parcel" has been deprived of all
economically viable use, he must rely on the default multifactor takings test set forth in
Perm Central. The United States Supreme Court identified the three factors as follows:
The [1] economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with [2] distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.
[Citation omitted.] So, too, is [3] the character of the governmental action.
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Id. at 124 (numbering added). For the reasons set forth below, MWDSLS's actions come
nowhere close to depriving Sorf s "whole parcel" of all economically beneficial uses, nor

<

can he show that the Perm Central factors, taken together, support his claim.
First, the SLA easement was established and recorded against what is now Sorf s
lot in 1946. MWDSLS's property rights, including the SLA corridor, are held in trust for
the public. MWDSLS is authorized by statute to promulgate regulations to protect the
public's property rights, w7ater infrastructure and MWDSLS operations. MWDSLS has
studied the negative effects of load and fill cover levels on certain classes of SLA pipe.
MWDSLS has also evaluated the effects of construction and installations on, and access

<

to, the SLA and SLA corridor for maintenance, repair (including emergency repairs), and
replacement of the SLA pipe. In these respects, MWDSLS brought this suit only because
Sorf s new construction and excavations violated and encroached upon MWDSLS's SLA
easement, and presented present and future risk to critical public water infrastructure and
MWDSLS operations. Sorf claims that MWDSLS is "strangling homeowners with rules

l

prohibiting all use of the easement area." (Appellant's Brief at 37.) This assertion is
wrong on its face, as the whole purpose of the regulations is not to bar homeowners
reasonable and appropriate use of the SLA corridor, but simply to ensure that activities
on the easement do not jeopardize a pipeline that directly and indirectly provides crucial
i

culinary water to some 500,000 people in the Salt Lake Valley.
Second, MWDSLS has plenary power to manage its assets held in trust for the
public. See Board ofEduc. ofJordan School Dist v. Sandy City, 2004 UT 37. ^ 31. 94
P.3d234 (local governments have wide latitude in the operation and administration of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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their utilities and assets to meet the challenges of urban growth, and therefore, the court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the city council); Price Dev. Co. v. Or em
Cit\h 2000 UT 26, IffflO, 19, 995 P.2d 1237 (same); Utah Code Ann. § 17B-l-103(2Yd)
(providing that local district may operate, control, and maintain public works to the full
exercise of the district's powers, and "exercise any power reasonably necessary for the
efficient operation of the local district"); id. at § 17B-l-301(2)fi) (empowering district to
"adopt and enforce rules and regulations for the orderly operation of the local district or
for carrying out the district's purposes"). Essentially, Sorf s counterclaim would
wrongfully ask the district court to "second guess" regulatory acts of MWDSLS. See,
e.g., Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County. 440 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir.
2006). This offends concepts of separation of powers and is not supported under case
law. Idj see also, Board ofEduc, supra; Price Dev., supra; State v. Hutchinson. 624
P.2d 1116 (Utah 1981); SLCv. Alfred. 437 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1968).
Third, MWDSLS has done nothing to deny Sorf all economically beneficial uses
of his land. The land was used as a moderately landscaped residential back yard before
Sorf bought it, and Sorf continued to use it as such for over two decades. It quite
evidently had economic value in that condition, because otherwise Sorf would not have
purchased it. The suggestion that the land is somehow valueless because Sorf cannot
make extensive additions—such as water features and buildings—is belied by the history
of the property, and are contrary to common practice and common sense.
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C.

SorFs Motion Was an Improper Motion to Reconsider.

The first procedural failing in Sorf s Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim is

i

that it was essentially a motion to reconsider the court's ruling on his Motion to Set Aside
Default. Utah Courts are very clear that motions to reconsider, however they may be
(

framed, are prohibited. Under the guise of an allegedly newly matured counterclaim,
Sorf asked the district court to again look at the effect of MWDSLS's easement and
regulations on his violative improvements on his lot. (See Sorf s Reply Memo Set Aside
at 3-13 (re: Meritorious Defense) (R. 289); Sorf s [Proposed] Answer at 1-2 (R. 122134.)) Such efforts are explicitly prohibited by Utah courts. See Tschaggeny v. Milbank

i

Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37. Tf 15, 163 P.3d 615 ("Motions to reconsider are not recognized by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."), citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24. Hf 12. 135 P.3d
861 ("We therefore affirm the court of appeals and direct attorneys to immediately
discontinue the practice of filing post judgment motions to reconsider.").
D.

Sorf Never Served a Pleading that Would Have Permitted Him to File
a Counterclaim Under Rule 13(d).

*

Sorf s Motion for Leave to file a counterclaim was founded on Rule 13(d), which
provides that a movant may, with the permission of the court, file a counterclaim as a
supplemental pleading, but only "after serving his pleading." Rule 13(d), Utah R. Civ. P.
Sorf never "serv[ed] his pleading." That is why the Default Judgment was entered.
Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer," which he filed as a supplement to his denied Motion to Set
Aside, does not satisfy the "pleading" requirement of Rule 13(d). The district court
denied Sorf s request for leave to file his Answer. Even if Sorf s "[Proposed] Answer"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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did satisfy Rule 13(d), Sorf did not file his counterclaim with his "[Proposed] Answer."
(R. 122-134). Rule 13(a) reads:
Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
UtahR. Civ. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). "[A] counterclaim not presented to the court on
a matter involving the same transaction is forever barred." Todaro v. Gardner. 285 P.2d
839. 842 (Utah 1955).
E.

Sorf Could Not Amend His Answer Because He Did Not Reopen the
Default Judgment

Under National Advertising v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App. 75, 131 P.3d
872, Sorf was required to first reopen the judgment by motion before moving for leave
and filing a counterclaim. Sorf failed in his efforts to accomplish this when the district
court denied his motion to set aside the default judgment. His Motion for Leave to File a
Counterclaim was not accompanied by a companion motion to reopen the judgment, nor
did it even reference the applicable rules. (See R. 374-485.) As the Court in National
Advertising stated:
In Utah, upon occurrence of "a final adjudication, and thereafter, a [party]
may not file an amended complaint. [Instead, the party] must move under
[r]ules 59(e) or 60(b) to reopen the judgment." Nichols v. State. 554 P.2d
231,232 (Utah 1976). Utah's rule is consistent with federal court holdings
under rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Combs
v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 382 F.3d 1196. 1205 (10th Cir.2004) ("After
a district court enters a final judgment... it may not entertain motions for
leave to amend unless the court first sets aside or vacates the judgment
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b)."); see also Cooper v. Shumwav.
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780 F.2d 27. 29 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("[0]nce judgment is entered
the filing of an amended complaint is not permissible until judgment is set
aside or vacated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b)." (citations
omitted).
National Advertisings 2006 UT App 75, ^f 13 (citations omitted).9
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, MWDSLS respectfully requests that the district
court's rulings be affirmed as well within its discretion and correct as a matter of law.
TzV
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National Advertising was ultimately decided on the timeliness of Appellee's Motion for
Leave to Amend under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). 2006 UT App. 75. If 26.
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CHAPTER 16

REGULATIONS FOR NON-DISTRICT USE OF
SALT LAKE AQUEDUCT AND
POINT OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUEDUCT
RIGHTS OF WAY
Last Updated: June 14, 2010

PREFACE
This chapter of the P&P contains regulations governing the use of the Salt Lake
Aqueduct (SLA) and Point of the Mountain Aqueduct (POMA) rights of way,
construction, excavation, removal and/or placement of materials, or other earthwork, on
SLA andPOMA rights of way, and construction near enough to SLA andPOMA rights of
way to potentially adversely impact those rights of way, by persons or entities other than
the District.
16-1

GENERAL BACKGROUND

(1)
SLA. The SLA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail
water service-ar-ea^ Sandy City's retail- water service area, and other areas of Salt LakeCounty and Utah County. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation
(Reclamation) designed and constructed the SLA under authority of the Reclamation Act
of 1902 and the Public Works Administration Appropriation Act of 1938. Since 1938,
the District has been responsible for the operation and maintenance of the SLA, has been
repaying to the United States all costs incurred in constructing the SLA, and has been
entitled to the use of the SLA. Pursuant to the Provo River Project Transfer Act,
Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the District, the Provo River
Water Users Association and the United States, title to the SLA was transferred to the
District on October 2, 2006.
(2)
POMA. POMA is a pipeline and associated facilities constructed by the
District to convey water to the District's member cities. The District owns POMA
facilities and is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all POMA facilities.
POMA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail water service area, Sandy
City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake County and Utah County.
(3)
The intent of this Chapter is to provide guidelines and authorization to
staff for the licensing of uses of District corridors. Licenses should reasonably
accommodate other uses of District corridors so long as it is clear that such uses will not
materially interfere with the District's interests in the use, operation, maintenance, repair
and replacement of District facilities. Except as otherwise directed by the Board, fees for
16-1
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licenses should be reasonably calculated to generally recover direct and indirect District
costs associated with evaluating, approving, and administering such licenses. The
Engineering Committee or Board may authorize licenses in addition to those the staff is
authorized to issue by this chapter, or make exceptions to the regulations, where doing so
would serve the interests of the District and the public.

16-2

GENERAL INTENT OF REGULATIONS

(1)
District Assumption of Reclamation Agreements. Reclamation has
historically provided, by agreement, underlying fee owners, adjoining landowners, and
others, the right to use portions of the SLA right of way pursuant to 43 United States
Code, Section 387; 43 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 429, and Reclamation
Manual/Directives and Standards LND 08-01. As a condition of title transfer, the District
assumes all of the rights and responsibilities of Reclamation under validly existing
Reclamation agreements for use of the SLA right of way.
(2)
District's Proprietary and Regulatory Interests. Portions of the SLA and
POMA rights of way are held in fee, and portions are held under easement. Portions of
the POMA right of way are located under roads or city parks pursuant to license or
franchise agreements. The application of these regulations will necessarily vary
depending upon the nature of the ownership interest of the District. Regardless of the
nature of the District's ownership interest in the right of way, the District has regulatory
authority as a subdivision of the State of Utah to protect District facilities.
(3)
Fair Market Value of Use of District Fee Lands. The District is generally
obligated by state law to charge fair market value for use of fee lands. E.g., Salt Lake Co.
Comm'n v. Salt Lake Co, Attorney, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Municipal Building
Authority of Iron Co. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533
P.2d 118 (Utah 1975). The District's policy is that it will make reasonable efforts to
comply with this requirement, and also reasonably recover the estimated actual costs to
the District of processing and administering Encroachment Agreements, but will
otherwise attempt to minimize charges.
(4)
SLA Rights Reserved by the United States. Pursuant to the Provo River
Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, the United
States transferred the title of the SLA to the District and the United States reserved an
easement for the continued, lawful, non-motorized public access across the SLA to
adjacent public lands. The United States also reserved an easement for Central Utah
Project facilities within Utah County. All uses of the SLA right of way are subject to
these easements. The District's General Manager may deny a new or renewed
encroachment agreement if the District or other agency has any outstanding
encroachment issues with the applicant or related persons or entities.
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(5)
Security. The SLA and POMA are critical public infrastructure, and as
such the use of SLA and POMA rights of way will be subject to federal, state, local and
District statutes, regulations, rules, ordinances, policies and procedures designed to
protect public health, safety and welfare.
(6)
Non-motorized Public Trail Development. The District believes that
public, non-motorized recreational trail use of portions of the SLA and POMA rights of
way can be developed in a manner that does not adversely impact the security of the SLA
or POMA, and does not adversely impact the District's ability to use, operate, repair,
inspect, maintain or improve SLA or POMA facilities. The District may allow such
recreational trail development.
(7)
Non-licensed Encroachments. The District may periodically review its
rights of way to identify non-licensed encroachments. The District may take action to
remove such encroachments or bring encroachments in compliance with these
regulations, including payment of all required fees and charges as applicable.
16-3

DEFINITIONS

(1)
"Applicant" - A person or entity who applies for issuance of an
Encroachment Agreement by the District.
(2)

"District"- The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy.

(3)
"Encroachment Agreement" - The Agreement issued to a Grantee who
has successfully completed the application process.
(4)
"Grantee" - The person or entity applying for and receiving an
Encroachment Agreement from the District for use of SLA or POMA rights of way. Any
reference in these regulations to "Grantee" should also be interpreted as referring to
Grantee's contractors, subcontractors, employees, agents or representatives.
(5)

"Hazardous Materials" include:

(a)
Those substances included within the definitions of "hazardous
substances", "hazardous materials", "toxic substances", or "solid waste" pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq., the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Section 1981, et seq., and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to such statutes.
(b)
Those substances listed in the United States Department of
Transportation Table (49 CFR 172.101 and amendments thereto) or by the United States
16-3
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Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302 and
amendments thereto).
(c)
Such other substances, materials and wastes which are or become
regulated or which are classified as hazardous or toxic under federal, state, or local laws,
statutes, ordinances or regulations. This does not include public sewers.
(6)
"POMA" or "Point of the Mountain Aqueduct" - A large transmission
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. The
District owns, operates and maintains POMA.
(7)
"Reclamation" or "Bureau of Reclamation" - A bureau of the United
States Department of the Interior that designed and constructed the SLA and originally
held title to the SLA.
(8)
"SLA" or "Salt Lake Aqueduct" - The SLA is a large transmission
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities.
Title to the SLA was transferred to the District on October 2, 2006 pursuant to the Provo
River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States.

16-4 WRITTEN ENCROACHMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRED
(1)
Vehicle Access. Except where SLA or POMA is located under a validly
existing public road, street or highway, a valid Encroachment Agreement is required for
any vehicle access on or over the SLA or POMA. Weight restrictions for SLA and
POMA pipe must be strictly observed.
(2)
Excavation, Earthwork, Construction, Etc. Any excavation, removal of
material, placement of material or other earth work, or construction work on SLA or
POMA rights of way where the District holds fee title or easement requires a valid
Encroachment Agreement.
(3)
Improvements to Previously Approved Encroachments.
Any
improvement to a previously approved encroachment on District rights of way requires a
new Encroachment Agreement.
(4)
Form of Encroachment Agreement. Encroachment Agreements shall be
specifically tailored to reflect the proposed use by the Grantee and, therefore, may
contain terms, conditions and/or limitations that are not reflected in previous or sample
Encroachment Agreements. The District's General Manager is authorized to execute
Encroachment Agreements that are consistent with these regulations and applicable law
on behalf of the District. All activities conducted on SLA or POMA rights of way
16-4
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pursuant to an Encroachment Agreement shall be in strict conformity with these
regulations.
(5)
Encroachment Agreement Time Periods. The Encroachment Agreement
is valid for the time period specified in the Encroachment Agreement. The maximum
time period for an Encroachment Agreement is 25 years if the Encroachment Agreement
is issued to a public agency or utility.- If the Encroachment Agreement is issued to a
private organization or home owner, the maximum time period is 15 years.
(6)
Encroachment Agreement Renewal. At the end of the effective time
period, the Grantee shall remove the encroaching facility or renew the Encroachment
Agreement. The Grantee shall pay all required fees and charges as applicable to renew
the Encroachment Agreement.
(7)
Grantees Responsible for Employees, Contractors. Grantees are strictly
liable for failure of their employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors to perform in
strict conformity with the Encroachment Agreement and these regulations.
(8)
Public Use of District Rights of Way. Use of District rights of way by the
public will not be permitted without a separate easement agreement requested by the
Grantee and granted by the District prior to issuance of the Encroachment Agreement.
16-5

APPLICATION PROCEDURES, FEES

The District's General Manager is authorized to develop application forms,
instructions, and procedures to guide the Grantee through the application process. The
District's Board of Trustees shall adopt a fee schedule for application fees, processing
fees, right of use fees, and any other fees consistent with these regulations. The Board
may delegate to the General Manager the ability to establish appropriate fees for use of
fee title lands. Fees for use of fee title lands may be waived in whole or in part by the
General Manager to the extent that the licensed use is determined to be beneficial to the
District (e.g., landscaping is developed and maintained by others).
16-6

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

(1)
Service Interruption. The SLA and POMA are pipelines that remain in
service year-round and are critical to the water supply of hundreds of thousands of
people. Service interruptions of either the SLA or POMA must be expressly
authorized by the District's General Manager, and are not permitted except in very
extraordinary circumstances. Unauthorized interruptions to pipeline service of the
SLA or POMA will not be tolerated and could result in the responsible party paying any
and all incidental and consequential damages including, but not limited to:
(a)

Lost revenue from water sales;
16-5
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(b)

Engineering personnel time;

(c)

Operation and maintenance personnel time;

(d)
service capacity;

All costs required to return the affected pipeline back to its full

(e)
Any costs incurred by the District's member cities that are over
and above the normal costs associated with the affected pipeline;
(f)
interruption; and
(g)

The value of the water which could not be used due to the
Third party claims tied to lack of water.

Unauthorized interruptions of service will likely result in criminal and civil actions,
particularly if determined to be willful or negligent The District will participate in,
and direct vigorous enforcement activities against any persons who cause, or who
are associated with causing, any unauthorized interruptions in service of the SLA or
POMA.
(2)
Contamination of"Water Supply. Water conveyed by theSLA and POMA
is used in a municipal and industrial water supply. The Grantee shall not introduce
pollutants or place foreign materials of any kind in water conveyance facilities. In the
event of a hazardous material spill, or if there is any release of materials into the water
that may affect the operation of the SLA or POMA5 the Grantee shall notify the District
immediately.
(3)

Prior Notice

(a)
Following the issuance of an Encroachment Agreement, the
Grantee shall invite the District to any Pre-Construction Meeting.
(b)
The Grantee shall contact the District either in writing or by phone
at least one week in advance of any planned test excavation or construction activities
within District rights of way.
(4)

Construction Activities

(a)
The Grantee shall designate a representative for field operations
who shall be the sole representative of the Grantee and the Grantee's contractors in
dealings with the District, and shall provide their name, address, and telephone number to
the District prior to commencement of construction.
16-6
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(b)
The Grantee shall limit its construction to the approved
encroaching facilities and construct the improvements strictly in accordance with the
approved plans or specifications.
(c)

The Grantee shall notify the District upon completion of

construction.
(d)
Within sixty (60) days after conclusion of construction operations,
all construction materials and related litter and debris, including vegetative cover
accumulated through land clearing, shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner.
(5)
Storage of Equipment or Materials. Equipment or materials shall not be
stored on access roads, or other access areas, unless specific written approval is given by
the District. All persons or entities using access roads shall coordinate with the District
to allow District personnel access to any access roads.
(6)

Hazardous Materials, Pesticides, Pollutants

(a)
Storage, handling, use, or transportation of hazardous materials is
strictly forbidden on or adjacent to any District right of way without the prior written
permission of the District. All state, federal and local statutes, rules, regulations and
ordinances concerning the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides,
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances shall be strictly observed.
(b)
Prior to the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides,
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances on or adjacent to District rights of
way, the Grantee shall obtain, from the District, approval of a written plan for such use.
The plan shall state the type and quantity of material to be used, the pest to be controlled,
the method of application, and such other information as may be required. All use of
such substances on or near the District rights of way shall be in accordance with the
approved plan. If the use of a substance is prohibited by the Environmental Protection
Agency, it shall not be used. If use of a substance is limited by the Environmental
Protection Agency, it shall be used only in accordance with that limitation.
(7)

Vegetation, Restoration and Reseeding

(a)
Except as otherwise agreed by the District in writing, ground
surfaces within District rights of way must be restored to a condition equal to that which
existed before the encroachment work began, or as shown on the approved plans or
specifications.
(b)
The Grantee shall exercise care to preserve the natural landscape
and shall conduct its construction operation so as to prevent any unnecessary destruction,
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scarring, or defacing of the natural surroundings in the vicinity of the work. Except
where clearing is required for permanent works, all trees, native shrubbery, and
vegetation shall be preserved and shall be protected from damage that may be caused by
the Grantee's construction operations and equipment unless otherwise directed by the
District. Movement of crews and equipment within the rights of way and over routes
provided for access to the work shall be performed in a manner to prevent damage to
roadways, grazing land, crops, or property.
(c)
Plans for restoration of District rights of way areas where soils and
surface materials are disturbed through actions incident to construction, operation, and
maintenance shall be approved by the District.
(d)
The Grantee shall be responsible for prevention and suppression of
all uncontrolled fires that are caused by the Grantee, its agents, or assigns. The Grantee
shall be responsible for restoration of damaged areas.
(8)
Damage to District Facilities. All damage to District facilities shall be
repaired by the Grantee to the satisfaction of the District. If emergency repair work is
necessary, or the Grantee fails to complete all work covered by the applicable agreement
with the District in a reasonable time as determined by the District, any remaining or
incomplete work will be performed by the District and the Grantee will be required to
reimburse the District for all expenses incurred by the District in completing the work.
(9)
Unanticipated Conditions.
If unanticipated field conditions are
encountered while a project is being undertaken, the District reserves the right to impose
additional or more stringent requirements than may be generally described in this
Chapter 16. The District may also issue a written amendment to the Encroachment
Agreement.
(10) Record Drawings. Within 30 days of completion of construction, the
Grantee shall provide to the District three (3) copies of record drawings. The record
drawings shall include, but not be limited to, X,Y,Z, GPS coordinates of District
facilities, utility crossings, manholes, drains, power poles, etc. A topographic survey
shall be completed to document any changes to grade. Electronic files of record
drawings shall be submitted to the District in a format acceptable to the District.
16-7

PROTECTION STANDARDS
(1)

Surface Structures

(a)
Surface structures are allowed within District rights of way so long
as construction and use of those surface structures do not alter or interfere with the use,
operation, maintenance, repair, replacement or improvement of any District facilities.
Approved surface structures include asphalt roadways (without utilities), parking lots,
16-8
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curbs, gutters, sidewalks, walkways, driveways and patios that are non-reinforced and not
connected to buildings. All surface structures are subject to approval by the District on
an individual basis.
(b)
Surface structures located over District pipelines shall be designed
to meet maximum allowable loading restrictions and minimum cover requirements as
determined by the District.
(c)
Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, if
the District determines that it is necessary to remove or damage surface structures for the
use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or improvement of any District
facilities, repair or replacement of the removed or damaged surface structures will be the
responsibility of the Grantee and its successors.
(2)
Buildings, Other Structures. Buildings and other permanent structures are
not allowed to be constructed within or overhanging District rights of way. The
following types of structures are not allowed: buildings, footings, foundations, retaining
walls, block or concrete slab walls, decks, carports, trailers, light poles, flag poles,
trampolines, motor cross facilities, power poles, swimming pools, wading pools or ponds,
decorative pools or ponds, or similar water features. Other types of permanent structures
not listed will be evaluated by the District for approval.
(3)

Vehicle Access Weight Restrictions

" " ~

~

"

(a)
No vehicular traffic will be allowed over Type A SLA pipe unless
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. No vehicular
traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over Type B, C, and D SLA pipe unless
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District.
(b)
No vehicular traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over
the POMA unless adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the
District.
(4)

Reasonable and Efficient District Access

(a)
The District shall have reasonable and efficient access to all
portions of District rights of way and facilities. No fences or similar barrier will be
allowed within District rights of way except as consistent with these regulations.
(b)
Except for District purposes, installation of new or replacement
fences is not allowed on District fee title property. Existing fences, previously authorized
by agreement prior to October 2, 2006, on or across District fee title property may, by
agreement, remain until District activities require removal. Other uses of District fee title
property will be allowed as set forth in other sections of this chapter of the P&P. Fences
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without footings or foundations may be allowed on property encumbered by District
easements on a case by case basis. Concrete walls and masonry block walls will not be
allowed. Grantee shall permit reasonable and efficient access to enclosed portions of
District rights of way.
(c)
Fences enclosing District structures or rights of way shall provide
gated openings large enough to permit reasonable and efficient access by District
maintenance vehicles without damaging the fence and improvements of the District rights
of way user. Grantee shall allow District to install District locks on access gates.
(d)
All fences within District rights of way are subject to removal by
District as required to maintain or replace pipe or structures. Except as otherwise
expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and replacement of fences shall be
the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors.
(5)

Trees and Vines

(a)
No new trees or vines will be allowed within District rights of way.
Existing trees and vines within 20 feet of centerline of District pipelines or on access
paths and roads used by District are not allowed. Existing trees and vines outside 20 feet
of centerline of District pipelines or on access paths and roads used by District may
remain until removal is required for safe operation or replacement of the pipeline or
access paths and r
^
"
'
" "
" ~ "
(b)
All vegetation within the District rights of way shall be maintained
by the property owner or Grantee, as the case may be. All vegetation within District
rights of way is subject to removal by District as required to maintain or replace pipe or
structures. Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and
replacement of vegetation shall be the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors.
(6)

Changes in Ground Surfaces, Lateral Support

(a)
All temporary or permanent changes in ground surfaces within
District rights of way are encroaching structures and require an encroachment agreement.
Grantee is required to comply with District requirements for minimum and maximum
depths of cover over the SLA and POMA.
(b)
Any fills and cuts on properties adjacent to District rights of way
shall not encroach onto District rights of way without specific written prior approval by
the District. Modifications of properties adjacent to District rights of way shall not
reduce lateral support for District rights of way without specific written prior approval by
the District.
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(7)
Drainage From or Onto District Rights of Way. Existing gravity drainage
over and from District rights of way must be maintained at all times. Any erosion from
construction, operation, maintenance or use activities must be controlled at all times. No
new concentration of surface or subsurface drainage may be directed onto or under the
District rights of way without a showing of adequate provisions for removal of drainage
water, and the specific prior written approval of the District.
(8)
Test Excavation. Prior to final design of any structure that encroaches
within District rights of way, an excavation must be made to determine the location of
existing District facilities. Any such excavation must be made only by, or in the presence
of, authorized District personnel.
(9)
Bedding for pipe or other District facilities. Compaction. Grantee is
required to comply with District requirement related to bedding of pipe and other District
facilities and compaction requirements.
(10) Metallic Strip. Any nonmetallic encroaching structure below ground level
shall be accompanied with an approved locator wire running through the entire length of
the District right of way.
(11)

Utility Crossings

~ ""
"(a) '" Utility crossings of""District" rights of way "will require an
encroachment agreement on an individual basis. All applicable state, city, and county
regulations shall be adhered to in the construction of utilities. Where utilities will be
constructed by or for a developer, but dedicated to a municipality or other local
governmental entity or regulated public utility, the District will require the Encroachment
Agreement to be signed by that municipality or other local governmental entity or
regulated public utility.
(b)
All utility crossings shall provide a minimum of eighteen (18)
inches of clearance between pipeline or conduit and the SLA or POMA. All sewer lines
shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each side of SLA or
POMA centerline, as directed by the District. All culinary pipeline crossings under the
SLA or POMA shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each
side of SLA or POMA centerline, as directed by the District. Carrier pipes shall consist
of either welded steel pipe or welded HDPE. Coating, lining and thickness of carrier
pipes shall be approved by the District.
(c)
Angles of crossing utilities shall be 90 degrees in relation to the
SLA or POMA whenever practicable, and not less than 60 degrees. Parallel utilities are
not allowed within District rights of way.
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(d)
Metal pipes which are in close proximity to and may affect District
pipelines shall implement corrosion protection measures that provide adequate protection
of the District's pipelines.

<

(e)
Boring of utility crossings may be required by the District.
Decisions will be made on an individual basis.
(f)
If material from the excavation is not suitable as backfill, it shall
be removed from the site by and at the expense of the Grantee.

i

(g)
Any buried utility shall be accompanied with warning tape. This
tape shall be located 12 inches above the structure and extend from right of way edge to
right of way edge.
16-8

(

APPEALS

Any decision of the General Manager regarding District rights of way may be
appealed to the Engineering Committee. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the
reasons for the appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the Engineering
Committee, the written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the
decision of the General Manager and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled
Engineering Committee meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. Any decision of
the"^
regarding T)lstoct rights o
District's Board of Trustees. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the reasons for the
appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the District's Board of Trustees, the
written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the decision of the
Engineering Committee and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled Board of
Trustees meeting. Replies will be answered in writing.
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

)
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, UTAH

THIRD JUDiCiA.L DISTRiC
SALT LAKE

)

21025
CASE NO: 100921025

)

DIPHT Y CLESX

I, Mel B. Ashton hereby certify under the penalties of perjury and in accordance with the provisions set forth by
the State of Utah, Section 78B-5-705 the following:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of i 8 years at the time of service herein, and am not a party to or
have an interest in the within action.
I received the attached SUMMONS, COMPLAINT, EXHIBITS AND LETER on October 28, 2010 and served the
same on October 28, 2010 at 5:40 p.m. on Zdenek Sorf, by serving his wife, Mrs. Sorf at 9825 South Mount Jordan
Road, Sandy, Utah 84092. The woman answering the door said that Zdenek wasn't home. I asked if she was his
wife and she said "yes". I told her I had a complaint and that I was serving her for Zdenek. She said that she
wouldn't take it and I dropped it on the floor inside the door of the house and walked away. She picked up the
papers and threw them at me and they landed in the driveway. Mrs. Sorf is a white female about 5' 5" tall, 115
pounds, brown shoulder length hair and about 45 years old.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
I further certify that at the time of service I endorsed the date and time of service and added my name thereto.

2#

Dated this $7 day of October, 2010

7rU?&^M^
Mel B. Ashton, DPS License PI00001
A. A. & Associates, Inc.
P.O. Box 964
Sandy, Utah 84091
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
-OF SALT LAKE-&-SANDY- - - - Plaintiff,

)
)

h
)
)
)

)

v.

DECLARATIQPfOF
MEL ASHTON

Civil No. 100921025

)

ZDENEK SORF,

)
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

)
)

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
MEL ASHTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
.1.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this declaration.
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2.

I am currently working as a certified process server and investigator licensed by

the Utah Department of Public Safety. I am a retired agent for the United Stated Drug
Enforcement Administration, having worked with them for 20 years, and I was a police officer
for Salt Lake City for 8 years before my employment with the DEA.
3.

On October 28, 2010, having been tasked with service of process of Summons

and Complaint on the defendant, Zdenek Sorf, I went to his home located at 9625 South Mount
Jordan Road in Sandy, Utah at 5:40 p.m. I rang the doorbell and a woman opened the door. She
was an adult who appeared well over the age of 21 years. There was another female who
appeared to be in her early teens standing behind the woman and they were smiling.
4.

I asked the woman if Zdenek Sorf was home and she responded: "He's not home

right now." I asked the woman if she was his wife, and she responded "Yes."
5.

I told the woman that I had a complaint that I was leaving with her for Zdenek

Sorf and she said she would not take it. I dropped the Summons and Complaint inside the door
at her feet and told her that she was served. She slammed the door. As I was walking back to
my car, she opened the door and threw the Summons and Complaint at me and they landed in the
driveway.
6.

I prepared the return of service of the Summons and Complaint, indicating that I

served Mr. Sorf s wife based on her representation that she was, indeed, his wife.
7.

On December 23, 2010,1 was tasked with service on the defendant of the Notice

of Default Judgment. I once again traveled to the residence at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road in
Sandy at 1:09 p.m.
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8.

I rang the doorbell.and the same woman answered the door. I said "Mrs. Sorf?"

and she said "Yes." I showed her the documents and she said "No" and slammed the door. I
said in a loud voice to be heard through the door that she had been served, and that the
documents were being left in the door. I left the documents and went back to my car.
9.

At the time of service of both sets of documents, the same woman answered the

door and on both occasions she represented herself as the defendant's wife.
DATED this H& day of February, 2010.

2 ^ f QJLJ^J
Mel Ashton"
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me on this ^

day of February, 2010.

>6fco
TAUNYAL ASHTON
NOTARY PUBUC • STATE of UTAH

COMMISSION #003873
COMM. EXP. 12-08*2014

1651278
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,

DECLARATION OF
DEBORAH M. WHARFF

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 100921025

ZDENEK SORF,

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DEBORAH M. WHARFF, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this declaration.
2.

I am a paralegal at the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, where I have
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been employed for 14 years.
3.

In September, 2010,1 was asked to review the state and federal court dockets for

prior law suits against the defendant in this matter, Zdenek Sorf. A state wide search revealed
Mr. Sorf as a named party in 28 suits, and in 27 of those 28 suits, Mr. Sorf is a defendant A
copy of a printout dated February 3, 2011 is attached as Exhibit A. The information contained in
Exhibit A is the same information reviewed in September, 2010, with the exception of the
addition of the instant case.
4.

From those actions identified on Exhibit A, I went to the dockets for the various

cases. 15 of theactionidentified on Exhibit A are tax liens filed for failure to paytaxes either
personally or for sales or other tax obligations of CNS Machine or Cruzrs Salon, Mr. Sorf s
business interests. There are both criminal and civil matters and several of the dockets from
these matters are attached at Exhibit B.
5.

The dockets at Exhibit B illustrate Mr. Sorf s extensive experience with the court

systems:
A.

Case 011903461: Mr. Sorf was arrested on 3-5-01 for disturbing the

peace and trespass. He failed to appear for arraignment and a bench warrant issued. He finally
appeared and eventually there was a bench trial He was fined and given 1 year probation.
B.

Case 014905627: In this divorce action Mr. Sorf was represented by

James McPhie. Personal service was achieved on his spouse, and he answered the complaint in a
timely manner. Mr. Sorf failed to pay support in subsequent orders to show cause was
eventually held in contempt by the court with judgment entered that was eventually satisfied.
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C.

Case 020100793: In this collection case Mr. Sorf was personally served

on 1-18-02. He failed to file an answer and default judgment was taken on 2-12-02.
Supplemental order issued and garnishments were served until eventual satisfaction of the
judgment.
D.

Case 040400428: In this matter, Mr. Sorf was served as doing business as

CNC Machine & Design. The agent (not Mr. Sorf) was served. No answer was filed and default
judgment was taken. A supplemental order issued and Mr. Sorf failed to appear, causing an
order to show cause to issue. Judgment was satisfied 6 months later.
E,

Case 056917406: This Labor Commission matter had an administrative

judgment entered. A writ of garnishment and supplemental order issued on the account of Mr.
Sorf s business, CNC Machine. No one appeared for the defendant A Writ of Execution
eventually issued and within 2 weeks, judgment was satisfied.
F.

Case 080904887: Workforce Services sued Mr. Sorf and his business,

CNC Machine. It appears that an administrative case was filed. Mr. Sorf was served with an
Order Enforcing Subpoena. An Order to Show Cause issued and was objected to by Mr. Sorf s
attorney, Bradley Wm. Bowen. This matter was dismissed.
G.

Case 081904729: This criminal matter involved a false information

charge against Mr. Sorf, who used the name Wayne Frank Barbuto, an individual whose address
is listed on the same street as Mr. Sorf s, as well as charges of operating a vehicle without
insurance and driving on a denied license. An arraignment was scheduled and Mr. Sorf failed to
appear. There is a $5000
warrant currently outstanding according to the docket.
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6.

In September, 2010,1 also entered Mr. Sorf s name into the Corporations

Division search engine to determine his business interests, if any. A copy of a current printout of
that information is attached at Exhibit C. Mr. Sorf is listed as an officer, director, or registered
agent of the following business interests:

7.

A.

Wasatch Front Entertainment, Inc.

B.

Sorf & Miller, Inc.

C.

Cruzrs Saloon, Inc.

D.

Evans and Sorf, LLC.

E.

CNC Machine and Design, Inc.

OnNovember22nd,2010,I was asked to attend a telephone conference with

Shawn Draney and Mr. Sorf. Mr. Sorf acknowledged service of the Summons and Complaint
and asked what could be done to solve the problem. Mr. Draney indicated that Mr. Sorf should
call District representatives who stood ready and willing to talk to him. Mr. Draney informed
Mr. Sorf that we intended to file a default certificate with the court in that he had failed to answer
the complaint. Mr. Draney explained to Mr. Sorf why the additional soil he had piled on top of
the Aqueduct pipe was a problem. Mr. Draney reiterated that the District had been trying to
work with him to solve the problem, but that he had failed to respond or to cooperate, forcing the
District to file the complaint. Mr. Draney indicated the District would still be willing to talk to
him, and provided telephone numbers for the General Manager and the Assistant General
Manager. When the telephone conference was completed, I immediately prepared a
memorandum to the file to memorialize the date and general content. A copy of that
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\

memorandum is attached at Exhibit D.

h

DATED this ^ ^ d a y of February, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this _ 2 daY of Feb:

SHELLY K. DEAL
Nofary Public Staie of Utah
My Commission Empires on:
July 10, 2014
Comm. Number: 5B3229
1649855
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU

MEMORANDUM
To:

SorfFile

From:

DMW

Date:

November 22, 2010

Subject:

CallfromSorf

Shawn received a telephone call today from Mr. Sorf. I was asked to attend to confirm
the content of the conversation.
Mr. Sorf asked "what can we do?" Shawn indicated that he needed to call Wayne or
Mike and set up a meeting with them. In the meantime, we are going to enter a default certificate
with the court as his time to answer had lapsed. Shawn indicated that Sorf could talk with the
District or hire counsel and that Shawn could talk to counsel.
Sorf said that all he did was "improve the lot". Shawn explained that the pipe was rated
for a certain weight and that when you piled soil on top the weight was exceeded and threatened
the water supply of about a half-million people. Sorf claimed he had tried to contact District
representatives.
Shawn gave Sorf the telephone numbers of both Wayne Winsor and Mike Wilson and
Sorf thanked him and hung up.
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I.

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OFSALTLAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff
v.

]
]
)
;)
I

]
)
]
)

ZDENEKSORF,

""

'

"

~

-

—

• —

•••

DECLARATIONS MICHAEL L.
WILSON

Civil No. 100921025
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant

DECLARATION
MICHAEL L. WILSON, states as follows:
. 1.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this declaration.
2.

I am the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake &

Sandy.
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3.

I have never received a telephone call or a voice mail from Mr. Zdenek Sorf.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Declaration is true
and correct

-art
EXECUTED this / " d a y of February, 2010.

€ / / / til

MiohaelL. Wilson
1652307
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT R MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneysfor Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALTLAKE& SANDY,
Plaintiff

;
]
)
;

j ™

-

•

;

-

—

-

-

DECLARATION OF WAYNE WINSOR

v.

)

CivilNo. 100921025

ZDENEKSORF,

])

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant

—•

]i

DECLARATION
WAYNE WINSOR, states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this declaration.
2.

I am the Engineering Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake &

Sandy.
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3.

I have never received a telephone call or a voice mailfromMr. Zdenek Sorf.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing Declaration is true
and correct
EXECUTED this "7 day of February, 2010.

(AJ
Wayne Wiijsor
1652312

2
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I

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
• OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plainth%
v.
ZDENEKSORF, •
Defendant.

]
);
)
)

DECLARATION OF
RYANNICHOLES

])

Civil No. 100921025

])

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
RYAN NICHOLES, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:
1.

I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in

this declaration.
2.

I am the IT Supervisor at the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy
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("MWDSLS") and have been since February, 2003.
3.

OnFebmaryl*,2011,I was asked to determine what records might be available

evidencing telephone calls received by MWDSLS from 801-301-1160 or 801-531-9944, the
telephone numbers provided to MWDSLS personnel by the plaintiff, I checked all incoming
telephone calls as far back as the systems would allow, between December 3,2010 through
January .31, .2011, and found neither of the plaintiff s telephone numbers in the 13 8 pages of calls
received by MWDSLS during that time period.
4.

I was able to document all incoming calls to all MWDSLS telephone lines,

including MWDSLS' General Manager, Michael Wilson, and MWDSLS' Engineering Manager,
Wayne Winsor, whose telephone numbers had been provided to the plaintiff. A printout of the
call information with regard to Mr. Wilson's telephone line ("631") is attached at Exhibit A. A
printout of that call information to Mr. Winsor's telephone line ("685") is attached at Exhibit B.
5.

I found no incoming calls from the numbers provided by the plaintiff from

December 3, 2010 to January 31,2011, whether to the MWDSLS systems generally, or to the
General Manager or the Engineering Manager5 s telephone lines.
DATED this j 7 _ day of February, 2011.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this J7_ day of February, 2011.
%

.•"

* - * "

—

* * ' * > ^ ^ ~ * * > ^ * > ^ * > * * + . ^

ANNALEE MUNSEY f
Notary Public
V
State of Utah
F

CfUt^Z
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires May 7, 2011 k
3430 E Danish Rd, Sandy, UT B4093 I
i i u 9 IWF^^PI u M * i"y«y^r¥^
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12/7/10 2:08 PM
8012547904
1291756127
685
1291756106
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12/14/101228 PM
1292354340
685
3037343413
12A4AD 12:29 PM
685
1292354874 12/14/1012:27 PM
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12/23/10 4:13 PM
7050
8015987217
685
1293145898 12/23/10 4:11PM
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1/11/119:45 AM
1294764S33
1/11/11550 AM
685
685
1/11/11950 AM
1294754633
685
600
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1/17/11836 AM
685
7050
1295278546
685'
8015687145
1/17/U855AM
1295278525
7050
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12/3/10 8:38 AM
631
631
70S1
1291390707
1291390736
12/3/10
8
3
8
AM
12/3
/10
8
3
8
AM
631
7050
1291390728
631
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I.

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff,

)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

v.
ZDENEK SORF,

APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Civil No. 100921025
Judge Fratto

Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Utah R. Civ. P., Plaintiff, Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS"), hereby applies for entry of Default Judgment against Defendant
Zdenek Sorf ("Defendant"), in the form submitted herewith, by the Court, based on the
following:
1.

Defendant was personally served with Summons and Complaint on October 28,

2010.
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2.

Defendant has failed to respond to MWDSLS's Complaint or otherwise appear in

this action.
3.

Defendant is not an infant nor incompetent person, nor in the armed forces within

the meaning of the Service Member's Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 520(1).
4.

The relief requested by MWDSLS in its Complaint can be readily ascertained and

awarded in a Default Judgment of this Court, in the form submitted herewith.
WHEREFORE, having satisfied the requirements of Rule 55(b)(2), Plaintiff requests that
Default Judgment be entered by the Court, in the form submitted herewith.

/$£
DATED t h i s / ^ f December, 2010
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

<^T~?.

Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin
Attorneys for Plaintiff MWDSLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I served the attached APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT
JUDGMENT upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid to:
Mr. Zdenek Sorf
9625 South Mount Jordan Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

tfrDATED this \

y

day of December, 2010.

16002-62 1592929

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM 10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

milliiijiiiT mum
'n/rdJudfcial District

m 17 20I|
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SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By
Senuty Cferk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff,

)
;)
)
;)

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

v.
)
;
)

ZDENEK SORF,

Civil No. 100921025
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment ("Motion") came before the Court on
March 8, 2011 at 2:30 p.m.
Defendant Zdenek Sorf appeared through counsel, Paul M. Belnap.
Plaintiff Meiropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy appeared through counsel,
Shawn E. Draney and Scott H. Martin.
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Based on the written submissions of the parties and oral argument presented, the Court
orders as follows:
1.

Based on the Court's finding that Defendant was properly served with the

Complaint and Summons, that Defendant has not made an adequate showing of excusable
neglect, mistake, or inadvertence in his failure to respond to the Complaint, and that those
defenses proffered by Defendant to Plaintiffs Complaint are not meritorious as a matter of law
under the circumstances given Plaintiffs defined easement, its prior federal ownership, and
Plaintiffs status as a political subdivision of the state, the Court hereby denies Defendant's
Motion,
2.

The Default Judgment entered December 13, 2010 by this Court remains in full

force and effect.
SO ORDERED this IT

day of March, 2C

&
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I served the attached [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT upon the party listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed via first class
U.S. Mail to:
Paul Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Casey W. Jones
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf

A

DATED this /r

day of March, 2011.

16002-62 1687687vl
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PROOF OF SERVICE

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

,
)
)

^

_ tr „, p
_^_
CASE NO: 100921025

I, Mel B. Ashton hereby certify under the penalties of perjury and in accordance with the provisions set forth by
the State of Utah, Section 78B-5-705 the following:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 18 years at the time of service herein, and am not a party to or
have an interest in the within action.
I received the attached Default Judgment on December 17,2010 and served the same on December 23,2010 at
1:09 p.m. on ZdenekZorfbv serving his wife, Mrs. Zorf at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road, Sandy, Utah 84092.
She answered the door and I said Mrs. Zorf and she said "yes." I showed her the Default Judgment and told her I
was serving her. She said "no" and slammed the door. The service was in the door. She is a white female, about 45
years old, brown shoulder length hair, 5'5" tall and 120 pounds.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing-is true and correct.

_

_

I further certify that at the time of service I endorsed the date and time of service and added my name thereto.

Dated this c M l a y of December, 2010

1?Ut& 6UArd
Mel B. Ashton, DPS Gl 00001
A. A. & Associates, Inc.
P.O. Box 964
Sandy, Utah 84091
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SALT LAKE COUNTY
By.
Deputy Clerk

SHAWN E. DRANEY (4026)
SCOTT H.MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile: (801)363-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Serve Defendant at:
Mr. Zdenek Sorf
9625 South Mount Jordan Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff,

)
;
I
]

v.

])

ZDENEK SORF,

)

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Civil No. 100921025
Judge Fratto

Defendant.

Due to Defendant Zdenek Sorf s ("Defendant") failure to appear and plead or otherwise
defend in this action, default judgment is hereby entered as follows:
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") is granted judgment against Defendant, as follows:
1.

Not later than twenty (20) calendar days after the entry of this Judgment and

sendee of theDigitized
samebyupon
Defendant, Defendant shall remove all improvements that
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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encroach on that portion of MWDSLS's Tract 417 of the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA")
corridor ("SLA Corridor") which crosses Defendant's Property (9625 South Mt. Jordan
Road (at 2550 East) Sandy, Utah) as follows:
a.

Defendant shall remove all encroachments not authorized by MWDSLS,

including, but not limited to, rock retaining walls, added fill material, gazebo, hot tub,
two (2) outbuildings, trees, and water features.
b.

Defendant shall return adequate soils and fill (25 to 3' in depth) on the

south portion of Defendant's Property traversed by the SLA.
_.. c:?

MWDSLS sl^l be given not les

before the work begins.
d.

MWDSLS shall have the right to observe and inspect all work performed

by or on behalf of Defendant, and direct the work as necessary to reasonably mitigate risk
to the SLA and related facilities.
e.

The work will be completed consistent with applicable MWDSLS

regulations.
f.

Defendant will immediately remove all impediments to access to the SLA

corridor by MWDSLS and its contractor(s). This will be accomplished by installing (at a
minimum) access gates with openings not less than 12 feet in width on the north and
south property lines. If Defendant desires to have a lock on the gate, he shall make
arrangements acceptable to MWDSLS for locks in series and allow MWDSLS to place
their own lock,
such
MWDSLS
hasLibrary,
access
to theClark
SLA
at all times.
Digitized
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2.

If Defendant fails to fully comply with Paragraph 1 immediately above,

MWDSLS, or MWDSLS' contractor, may move and remove all described encroaching
improvements, and Defendant is hereby enjoined from interfering with such work. MWDSLS
may seek additional judgment or judgments for any costs incurred as a result of Defendant's
i

failure to fully comply with paragraph 1 above.
3.

For that portion of Defendant's home that is located within the SLA Corridor,

Defendant shall enter a standard cooperation agreement with MWDSLS allowing for the home's
continued occupation of the SLA Corridor.
_ 4. _ ..Defendant is hereby enjoined from any future trespass upon MWDSLS property
interests in the SLA across or adjoining Defendant's Property, and all violations of MWDSLS
regulations regarding the SLA.
ENTERED this \r)

day of December, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

S

District Court Judge Fratto
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When recorded return to. '
RECORDER, SALT LAKE CDUHTf, UTAH
Snow, Christensen &.'Martineau
METRQFaiTflH WATER DIST OF SL
Attn: Shavm'E. Draney
3430 E DANISH RD
9AHDY UT 84093
10 Exchange -Place
* BM ZJftt DEPUTf - HI ISO P.
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(Quitclaim Deed No. 1 under Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950)
QUITCLAIM DEED
(Salt Lake Aqueduct, Salt Lake County Lands)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMEMCA (Grantor), acting by and throiigh'the Bureau of
Reclamation, Department of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 17,1902
(32.Stat. 388), and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, particularly the Provo River
Project Transfer Act (Public Law 108-382,118 Stat. 2212). hereby quitclaims and conveys to*
METROPOLITAN WATEf. DISTRICT OF SALr LAKE & SANDY (Grantee), a political
subdivision of the State-of Utah, 3430 East Danish Road. Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093, for*
Ten Dollars (SI'0.00) and Other good tod valuable'consideration, all of Grantor'sright,title and
interest in and to lands and interests in lands located in Salt Lake Coun1yv Utah, commonly
referred to as the Salt Lake Aqueduct more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached .and by
this reference made a part hereof.
lOCiEJHEK
located h\ under or upon -such lands or interests in lands.

.

TOGETHER WITH the rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the Grantor
which exist, as of the date of this Quitclaim Deed, as a result of any. valid right^of-use agreements
catered, by. Grantor. The Grantee, shall honor the terms of each such right-of-use agreement, as
de^ribei m-the Provo River Project Transfer Act and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated*"
November^3*2004.
ALL OF THE ABOVS described lands or interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvstnents,
Extures. features, and appurtenances are hereinafter collectively referred to as. the "Real Property''.
This Quitpiaiin Deed shall be interpreted as conveying all of Grantor's interest, present.and future,
in all lands, interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements,fixtures,features and
appurtenances that in anywise are a pail of or essential to the ownership, operation, or
maintenance of the Aqueduct Division of the Provo River Project lying or located within Salt Lake
Coilnty. Utah, whether acquired or constructed by or for Grantor, ar-acquired or constructed by or
"for Grantee, or constructed by or for otherspursuant to righi-ofruse agreements, except as
expressly excluded or reserved below.
THIS CONVEYANCE DOES NOT INCLUDE OR MODIFY:
1, .Any interest in or to any National Forest system lands crossed by the Salt Lake
Aqueduct As to such lands, Grantor shall convey to Grantee, by separate instrument an
appropriately sized, permanent easement for the use, operation, maintenance, repair, improvement

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and replacement of fh£ Salt Lake Aqueduct, as described in the Provo River Project Transfer Act
and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950.
2. Any interests in water rights orrightsto use water.

x

,

3. Any oil, gas or other mineral rights or interests held in the name of the United States;
.provided, ho wever3-that any future exploration for oil, gas or other Federally owned minerals or
minerals rights or interests underlying the Real Property shall be conducted in such, a manner as
will not compromise the structural integrity of, or interfere with the use, operation, maintenance,
repair or replacement of, the Salt Lake Aqueduct, or related facilities, equipment, improvements,
• fixtures, features or appurtenances; providedfurthertihatno surface occupancy for exploration'or
exploitation of oil, gas, or other Federally owned mineral?rightsor interests shall be allowed on
the Real Property,
. THIS CONVEYANCE IS SUBJECT TO:
1. Oil, gas.,, and other mineral rights reserved of record by or in favor of third-parties as of
the date of this Quitclaim Deed.
2. Valid permits, licenses, leases, rights-or-use, or rights-of-way of record or outstanding
on, over, or across Ihc Real Property in existence on the date of this Quitclaim Deed.
3.' Aperpetud easement reserved by Grantor on, over, or across theJRealProperty to.
provide for lawfol continued non-motorized public access to and across the Real Property for
recreational purposes; provided that such non-motorized public use shall not interfere with the use,
operation, maintenance, repair, improvement, replacement or protection of the Salt Lake Aqueduct
and related facilities, equipment, improvements,fixtures,features and appurtenances, and such
non-motorized public use shall be subject to all existing and future state, federal, local and Grantee
statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, policies and procedures regarding safety and security.
4. Title to any equipment, improvements,fixtures,features and appurtenances which axe
part of the Provo River Project, Utah, Deer Creek Division, is hereby reserved to the Grantor. '
5. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which are .
part of the Central Utah Project is hereby reserved to the Grantor.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN Hiat:
1. Acting pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 373, on April 23, May 3, and May 18,
2006, the Grantor performed a hazardous waste survey of the Real Property, and a copy of said
survey was .delivered to the Grantee in a letter dated September 26,2006. The Real Property
conveyed herein to the Grantee is being conveyed in the same condition as existed on the date of
. said survey and which is more particularly described in that survey. No remediation by the
Grantor on behalf of the Grantee has been or will be made.
2. The Grantee has used, and has had operation and maintenance responsibility for the
Real Property for over 50 years. Grantee and its successors and assigns accept the Real Property
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"as is" and also accept liability for the Real Property from the date of this Quitclaim Deed
forward.
3. The Grantee, its successors and assigns shall be responsible for the protection,
identification, and preservation of cultural resources, if any, located on the Real Property as
required by the existing and future laws of the State of Utah.
4. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed as including the quitclaim,
abandonment, forfeiture, or relinquishment by the Grantor of its basic patent right reserved by the
Act of August 30,1890 (26 Stat. 391) as to the described lands for easements claimed, or to be
claimed, for purposes other than the Salt Lake Aqueduct; j
5. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as altering or
amending the terms or conditions of any United "States-contract, or supplements or' amendments
thereto, except as specifically provided in Article 20 of Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated
November 23, 2004.

^,

6. If any further specific conveyances-should be necessary .hereafter, because of the
discovery *of additional Real Property not listed on the Exhibits, to more specifically and legally
describe the Real Property, or because the Grantor acquires any title to or interest in the Salt Lake
Aqueduct by reason of an'instrument in the Grantor's chain of title, or by operation of law, then
Grantor:shall make reasonable efforts to provide such conveyances, on the same terms and
conditions setforthabove.
_ •
_
_
_
7, Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as creating any
. condition subsequent, reverter, or possibility of a reverter.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto Grantee, and Grantee's successors and assigns, the Real
Property; together with all the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, forever.
WITNESS the hand of the Grantor this 2nd day of October, 2006.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Regional Director, Upper Colorado Region
Bureau of Reclamation
Acting for the Secretary of Interior
of the United States
Approved:

tSice of<&e Regional Solicitor

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this 2nd "day of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Rick L. Gold, known to me to be
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, United States
Department of the Interior, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same on behalf of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, pursuant to authority
delegated ts him from the Secretary of the Interior.

(NOTARY SEAL)

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah
Residing at:
Cfi^^r^l-^

^ PAULINE P BROWN
% fSJWr^Wjaft'OTBf «0»HI

•:'», -sea £*$* im SOUTH I
' * WtfWO, VTfth &4W6J
CGEMEXF. 06-07-2010
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ACCEPTANCE
The parties intend for the above Quitclaim Deed to satisfy a portion of the terms of Contract No.
04-WC-40-8950, dated November 23,2004!, and a portion of the requirements of Public Law 108382. The Grantee accepts this Quitclaim Deed on the terms and conditions stated herein. The
Giantee hereby farther agrees and acknowledges' that: (1) the Salt Lake Aqueduct shall no longer
be regarded or treated either as a Provo River Project or a United States facility, except with
regard to Provo River Project water as provided for in Section 17 of Contact No. 04-WG408950, dated November 23,2004; the Grantee shall not be entitled to receive any future
Reclamation benefits with respect to the Real Property, except for benefits that would be available
to other non-Reclamation facilities; and (3) to the fullest extent allowed by law, the Grantee agrees
to indemnify and hold harmless the Grantor, its officers and employees from any claims, liabilities
or other responsibilities which may arise subsequent to the date of this Quitclaim Deed which
result from the Grantee's .use, operation, or maintenance of the Real Property as described in this
Quitclaim Deed.
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
QF SALT LAKE. & SANDY

lael L. Wilson, General Manager
*N

Approved:

i. Draney,
Counsel Jfor Metropolitan W&er District of Salt Lake & Sandy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

STATE OF UTAH .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss.

On this 2nd day of October, 20069 personally appeared before me, Michael L." Wilson, known to me
to be the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, the signer of
the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, pursuant to authority delegated to himfromthe
Board of Trustees of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy.

-tNeTAft¥-S-EA£)-

4

ft f%uv<S^

-Notary Public iii ami fur ttorState of Utah
Residing at:

^SHEFSRSSNI
\% ifMTCftKfef&VffSNa
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K- »• 7 *.'. i» liu»r»'S!fa. »**[s: t (Zsaae,
Rf*ujti*r«. rv.*w U&fcsgowits/ ut,ah

• wugrtm' DEEP or Mmflfflfr %r3 gagey'^y^ne^s.
KErROPOIIUH WATER liltfTrliT Of liaLT UKE CBCTX, A metropolitan water district
organised and existing under ane* by jrirtue of the l a w of the Stats of $teh|
with i t s principal place of -business at Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, Qrantor> hereby conveys and warrants to THE UNITED STATES OF
XMfe&ICAj acting pursuant **? the provisions of the Xot of JUHB 17, 1902 (32
3 t a t i , 388), and act A a&endatory thereof or supplementary thereto ^ (irsatee,
for the KW of T«D Hundred Twenty and 75/lOD (J220>7£) Dollars

I
*^*

k perpetual easement to construct and reconstructj operate and
njaintain an underground 'jSipe^inB and. appurtenant structures,
which l a t t e r mity be situated above ground surface', oil, over or
across the following described property situated, in Salt Lake
County,, State of Utahi

QUI

A stripy of land in the South Half of the Southeast Quarter of
the Uortheast Qoartur (SjSEsNEi.) of Section Tea (10) > Township
Three (3) South, Range One ( l ) Eastf Salt Lake Bass and Heridianj
One Hundred Twenty-five (125) feet wide and included between two
lines extended to M:.« properly lineB end everywhere^distant
Seventy-five (75) feet Host or to t i e l e f t sad Fifty ( 5 0 ) f e e *
- East or .to the light or the following described, center lino of
vhat i s kicwn as the Salt Lake/aqusdpot from Station 1679+33
to Station lbSo+15 measured -at right angles &nd/or radially
thereto, Said center line i s more particularly desorlbed aa
follows\
Beginning at Station 1679+83 a point on the South Hue of the
Orantci^s property in said Section 10» from Mhleh point the
Northeast corner of said Section 10 l i e s North Twenty-aix Hundred
ISfimty-Feven and one-tenth (2o27,l) feet and East Seven Hundred
S iveirty-five and E.ght~tenths (7?5t6) f e e t , more or laasj and
running thenoe North 7*!!.1 Bast Si* Hundred Thirty-two (632.) feat,.
more or lees* to Station 16&&&5 of said Aqueduct center line., a
point on the Korth Una of:the Qrantor'a property> from \faich. point
the Northeast 'corner of said Section 10 l i e s Horth Twenty Hundred
*n& one-tenth '(2000*1) feat and. East Six Hundred .Hinety^-six and
Eight-tenths (69c-»8) 'feet, mere or l a s s j containing 1*61 acres,
more or I s s a ,
aleoi a s t r i p of lane" in the North Half of the Southeast Quarter
of the northeast Quarter (ffiSB^j) of Section Tea (10), Township *
Three (3) South, Bange One (1) East, Salt Lake Base end Meridian,
One Hundred Twenty^five (125) fast vide and included between two
lines extended to the property lines and eTfiryvber© distant Ssrant^
fi-wb (?5) laat "Heat or to the left and ELfty (50) feet East or t o
the right of the following described center line of. -what i s )ctonm ,
as the Bait'lake aqueduct froia. Station 1684+15 to .Station 1692+fc,
Toaasursd at right angles and/or radially 'tkerBto* Said cents* Una
i s iBore particularly described as follows*
- •
.' .^

" vi•4^ :^?5/v ^ ,^,
^jjwpr

7Z&

£ W JfT*'^*XVtt®#M
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Beginndag at S t a t i o n 1686*15 * point on the South Una of t h e Grantor*a
property In e.aid Section 10,* from which paint the Northeast c o m e r o f
s a i d S s o t i o n 10 l i n e a Korth Twenty* Hundred and Qne-tanth (200Q»1) 5 e e t
and East S i x Hundred Ninety-aix and El^i-tenfchs (696.8) f e e t , more
o r l«»saj and ronnin* thence North f*ll* East Three Hundred Hine and
Eight-tenths (309 I8J f e e t j thence on a regular curve t o t h e r i g h t
having a radiuB of Sixteen Hundred (1600) f e e t , and a distance of
One Hundred Twenty and One-tenth (120.1) f e e t , aa measured on t h e
a r , of t h e curve; thence Korth 11*29 f East T*o Hundred Thirty-seven
ei\d One-tenth (237 i l ) f*ofc t o Station 1692+82 of a&id-Aqueduct c e n t e r
U n a , a point on the North line" oC the Grantor's property, from *ft&ch
point t h e Northeast corner of eoid Section 10 l i e s Korth Thirteen Hundred Forty-one and Rlne^tenthn (1341.9) f e t and East Five Hundred
Hinety-one and Four-tenths (591*4) f*»ct. mora or l e a n ; containing 1.57
a c r e s , more or l e a s .
The t o t a l area of the above-deacribed t r a c t s i s 3«3S a c r e s , wore or l a e a *
IN Vj33!KE5S VKEE3^
cauaed t h i a deed t o he signed b y i t s
Chairman of t h e Board, of Directors *nd it.a corporate s e a l t o be' a f f i x e d
~
t h e r e t o thia
22nd
day of Augu-Bt
, 1?$?..
KB2?RQPaUITA^ATa!v.^IJTRia, OP SALT LAKE CITT

*?°* \V^^L)
secretary ^

Chnirniftno? i t s ^oardf'oT&mctc'-a

SEATB OF UTAH
COUKTX OF SALT LA1CE
On the 22nd day of August* , 1952, paraqrwlly appeared, before me,
George !?• Snyder
*ho # heing duly' sworn by tte> • did aay t h a t he i s t h e
Chairman of tha Board of D i r e c t o r s of the Metropolitan' Vfater Distri'ot o f S a l t Laka
City* end t h a t a a i d inatruneut was signed i » behalf of s a i d D i s t r i c t pursuant to
authority of a r e s o l u t i o n o f i t s Board of Directors, and aaid
George v» Bnyder acknowledged t o me 'that said d i s t r i c t executed t h e asme*
Qr?**~**+—*>L

**-4
Notary Public, Rosidin^ at Salt Lake
City, County of Salt Late, State of
Utah.

•"•vsfen. ^ftfr&fc.
sion .Expires i
"" 1952

um

• W

,
k^i*.

•••:*>•"

«5&.5
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Casey W.Jones, #12133
STRONG & HANNI

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
pbelnap(g),stron gandhanni. com
bbowen(g),strongandhanni.com
ci ones@strongandhanni. com
Attorneys for Defendant Zdenek Sorf

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATEOFUTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE & SANDY,

DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM
(PROPOSED)

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No.: 100921025

ZDENEK SORF,

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant.

Defendant and Counterclaimant, Zdenek Sorf, by and through counsel, alleges as
follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Zdenek Sorf is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("District") is an independent

political subdivision of the State of Utah with offices located in Salt Lake County.
3.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-5-102 and 78B-

4.

Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-301(l), as the real

3-205.

property that is the subject matter of this action is located in Salt Lake County.

FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

The Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA") is part of the public water delivery

infrastructure in Salt Lake City and County.
6.

The SLA corridor consists of easement and fee lands purportedly held by the

District.
7.

Mr. Sorf owns the residence at 9625 S, Mount Jordan Road in Sandy, Utah.

8.

Mr. Sorf has lived in his residence for nearly 24 years. The SLA easement

covers the majority of Mr. Sorf s backyard and even extends into the southeast corner of his
home.
9.

Mr. Sorf has spent nearly $150,000 improving, designing and developing his

backyard landscaping.
10.

A default j udgment was entered against Mr. Sorf on December 13,2010.

11.

In light of the default judgment, the District is demanding Mr. Sorf permanently

remove, at his expense, all structures that sit on or near the SLA easement in his backyard
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including, but not limited to, rock retaining walls, added fill material, gazebo, hot tub, two (2)
outbuildings, trees, and water features.
12.

In light of the default judgment, the District is also demanding Mr. Sorf, at his

expense, return adequate soils and fill (2' to 3' in depth) on the south portion of his property
traversed by the SLA.
13.

In light of the default judgment, the District required Mr. Sorf to install gates

with openings not less than 12 feet in width on the north and south property lines. The purpose
of the gates is to create an access point for the District, and its contractors, to access the SLA
corridor pursuant to their discretion.
14.

As a condition of using the property within the easement, the District, through

the default judgment, is requiring Mr. Sorf to enter an agreement entitled "Cooperation
Agreement" (hereinafter "Agreement") that restricts and regulates the use of Mr. Sorf s property
and what can be done with the property.
15.

Under the Agreement, the District is requiring that various structures on Mr.

Sorf s property be permanently removed (i.e. added fill material, turf areas, rock retaining walls,
fencing and access gates, flat work, concrete and rock pathways, garden boxes, an electrical
utility line, a motorcycle barn, an equipment shed, a gazebo and hot tub, deck, water feature, and
trees within the SLA corridor), and is precluding the construction of future improvements
without first receiving written permission from the District.
16.

The southeast corner of Mr. Sorf s home encroaches approximately 4.3 feet

onto the SLA corridor. The District requires that for the encroaching portion of Mr. Sorf s home
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to remain in place. Mr. Sorf must enter the Agreement and the terms of the Agreement must
remain in effect.
17.

The District, in the Agreement, prohibits Mr. Sorffromperforming any work on

the portion of his property that is within or close to the SLA corridor without approval from the
District.
18.

Any work performed by Mr. Sorf on the areas of his property within or close to

the SLA Corridor must be consistent with construction standards set by the District.
19.

The District retains authority to stop work and require correction of any work,

or replacement of any materials, on Mr. Sorf s property which in its reasonable judgment does
not comply with any term or condition of the Agreement.
20.

In the event the District desires to have improvements on Mr. Sorf s property

inspected by a qualified professional, Mr. Sorf is obligated to reimburse the District for the cost
of such an inspection.
21.

If the District modifies or destroys any of the improvements installed on Mr.

Sorf s property that are within or in close proximity to the SLA corridor, Mr. Sorf must
personally bear the financial implications of such actions.
22.

The Agreement is only good for five (5) years and has a maximum duration of

fifteen (15) years. Renewal of the Agreement is not guaranteed.
23.

The Agreement can be terminated, for any reason, at the discretion of either

party.
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24.

If a new agreement is not entered before the Agreement's expiration, Mr. Sorf s

right to use his property, including the portion of his house that falls within the SLA corridor,
could be terminated.
25.

If the Agreement is terminated, Mr. Sorf will be expected to remove any

improvements made to the SLA corridor, restore the SLA corridor according to District's
specifications, and reimburse the District for any costs owed.
26.

In any dispute relating to the Agreement, the District will not be liable for

consequential damages to Mr. Sorf even if the District is found to be at fault.
27.

Any rights given to Mr. Sorf in relation to use of the SLA corridor cannot be

assigned or transferred without prior written consent of the District. The District is under no
obligation to approve an assignment or transfer of Mr. Sorf s rights.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Inverse Condemnation
28.

Mr. Sorf incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

29.

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall

not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
30.

Mr. Sorf owns the property located at 9625 S. Mount Jordan Way.

31.

Mr. Sorf has protectable interests in his property and has the right to just

compensation when his property is taken for public use.
32.

A default judgment was entered against Mr. Sorf on December 13, 2010.
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33.

The default judgment demands Mr. Sorf remove, at his expense, extensive

landscaping and multiple physical structures from his property.
34.

The default judgment restricts and otherwise limits the ways in which Mr. Sorf

can use, develop and maintain his property.
3 5.

The default judgment demands Mr. Sorf enter an Agreement with the District so

that the southeast corner of his home can continue to occupy the SLA corridor. The Agreement
gives the District further authority to regulate and restrict the usage of Mr. Sorf s property.
36.

The default judgment obtained by the District and the restrictions and

regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property are for a public use, i.e. to provide water to the
Salt Lake Valley and Salt Lake County.
37.

The effect of the default judgment, in addition to the restrictions and regulations

imposed by the District in relation to Mr. Sorf s property, foreclose any feasible option for Mr.
Sorf to use his property.
38.

The effect of the default judgment, in addition to the restrictions and regulations

imposed by the District in relation to Mr. Sorf s property, have eliminated any economically
viable use of Mr. Sorf s property.
39.

When considering the actions of the District in this matter through the default

judgment and the restrictions and regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorf s property, the
character of the governmental actions, the economic impact of these actions on Mr. Sorf, and the
extent to which the regulatory actions have interfered with Mr. Sorf s use and enjoyment of his
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property, constitute a taking of protected property interests for a public purpose for which just
compensation must be paid.
40.

The District's actions through the default judgment and the restrictions and

regulations being imposed on Mr. Sorfs property constitute the inverse condemnation of Mr.
Sorfs property and a regulatory taking for which Mr. Sorf is entitled to just compensation from
the District, in an amount to be determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Sorf demands judgment as follows:
A.

Mr. Sorf is entitled to an order declaring that the District's actions

constitute the inverse condemnation of Mr. Sorfs property and a regulatory taking for which Mr.
Sorf is entitled to just compensation from the District in an amount to be determined at trial; and
B.

Mr. Sorf is entitled to an awardfromthe District of his costs of Court,

attorney fees and such other relief as the Court deems just.
JURY DEMAND
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Sorf hereby demands a
jury on all issues triable to a jury and submits the statutory fee.
DATED this

day of April, 2011.
STRONG & HANNI
By
Paul M. Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Casey W. Jones
Attorneys for Zdenek Sorf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herby certify that on this

day of April, 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM (PROPOSED) and a copy of this Certificate
of Service wsre served by the method indicated below to the following:
Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
e-mail

003770.00701

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

